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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate officers and directors owe significant duties to the corpo-
ration. Generally shareholders do not.' This article reviews the role of
shareholders in a corporation and the distinction between corporate and
individual assets, and discusses the impact of these factors upon the ex-
tent of the duties imposed on shareholders. It then discusses the duties of
a shareholder regarding shareholders' meetings and the voting of shares,
the duties of a controlling shareholder, the duties of a shareholder in a
closely-held corporation, and the duties of a shareholder selling or buy-
ing shares. The primary focus of the article is the duties of shareholders
under state corporation law, with occasional references to duties which
may exist under federal securities law. The purpose of the article is not
only to discuss the specific legal doctrines regarding the duties of share-
holders, but also to point out the connection between those doctrines and
several more general ideas imbedded in the law of corporations.
II. THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS IN CORPORATE AFFAIRS
Modem corporation statutes generally provide that the business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of its
board of directors,2 which is expected to act on behalf of all sharehold-
ers.3 Absent special circumstances, the shareholders of a corporation
have no right to participate in the management of the business. While
1. Generally, the liability of shareholders to a corporation is limited to paying for the shares
issued to them. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 6.22(a) (1984).
2. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1986); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Aar § 8.01(b) (1984);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1969).
Considerable evidence suggests that directors of publicly held corporations do not in fact per-
form the functions contemplated for them by corporation statutes, but instead play a much less
significant role. See Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L.
REv. 293 (1979).
3. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 45 (3d Cir. 1947) (holding that when a director
votes as a director he or she represents all shareholders).
[Vol. 28:213
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they may elect4 and remove' directors, adopt or alter bylaws,' express
their views on the management of the business,7 and approve or disap-
prove of certain extraordinary transactions proposed by the board of di-
rectors,' they lack the power to initiate corporate action.9
In most cases a requirement that shareholders approve corporate
action would be unwise since a shareholder usually lacks the information
necessary to decide how to vote on the matter and, in many cases, would
view the cost of informing herself on and evaluating a matter as out-
weighing the expected benefit to her from the decision. For example,
assume the potential benefit to a small shareholder from a change in sup-
pliers is $10 and the cost to obtain adequate information and to evaluate
it in order to vote is $50. In such a case, the rational economic decision
for the shareholder is to be apathetic.1 In addition, many corporations
could not function if shareholders were given a broad role in manage-
ment.I1 Thus, it is likely that most shareholders view the corporate man-
agers as better able to decide most issues relating to the business of the
corporation. 12
A majority of state corporation statutes permit the powers of the
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216; REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (1984).
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k); REVISED MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 8.08(a) (1984).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a); REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 10.20(b)
(1984).
7. See Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1954) (permitting shareholders to express
opinion on removal of president even though they were powerless to reinstate him).
8. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT §§ 10.03 (amending of articles of incorpo-
ration), 11.03 (plan of merger or share exchange), 12.02 (sale of all or substantially all of assets other
than in regular course of business), 14.02 (dissolution) (1984).
9. See Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11, 19-20 (1867) (holding that shareholders have no power
to authorize conveyance of corporate property). Under the modem view, action by a sole share-
holder binds the corporation on the theory that the shareholder is the equitable owner of the assets
of the corporation. See, e.g., L.R. Schmaus Co. v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 1044, 1045 (7th Cir.
1969) (authorizing payment of bonuses by corporation); Rapp v. Felsenthal, 628 S.W.2d 258, 260
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth [2d Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd, n.r.e.) (holding corporation bound by employ-
ment contract entered into by shareholder even though directors never formally authorized the con-
tract). Similarly, a corporation is generally bound by an act that is approved, even informally, by all
shareholders unless the rights of corporate creditors are involved. See Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v.
Crosland-Cullen Co., 234 F.2d 780, 783 (4th Cir. 1956) (estopping corporation from denying assign-
ment of life insurance policy because no rights of creditors shown to be involved); Snyder v. Free-
man, 266 S.E.2d 593, 597-99 (N.C. 1980) (allowing plaintiff to prove alternatively that corporation
was bound to a contract approved by all shareholders); Burger v. Western Sand & Gravel Co., 237
S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo, 1950, writ ref'd, n.r.e.) (holding corporation bound by
lease renewal approved by all shareholders where corporation had no debts).
10. See Robert C. Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 776, 779-
81 (1979) (discussing rational apathy).
11. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1969).
12. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395, 402-03 (1983).
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board of directors to be limited and the powers of shareholder to be ex-
panded by the articles of incorporation.13 In addition, the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act permits dispensing with the board of
directors in corporations with 50 shareholders or less. To do so, the arti-
cles of incorporation must specify a person or group who will perform
the duties of the board.14 The Delaware statute also permits the articles
of incorporation to dispense with the board of directors with no limit on
eligibility based upon the number of shareholders in the corporation.'-
The shareholders exercising powers normally vested in the board of di-
rectors are subject to duties of directors where the articles of incorpora-
tion restrict the powers of the board of directors by requiring shareholder
approval of an action or dispense with the board of directors by authoriz-
ing management by the shareholders. 16
A number of states have special statutory provisions permitting
great flexibility in structuring the pattern of management for a close cor-
poration. Generally an election is required in order for a corporation to
be a statutory close corporation. 17 Statutory close corporation status is
often available only to corporations with a limited number of sharehold-
ers. 8 These close corporation statutes usually validate shareholder
agreements regulating the management of corporate affairs. 9 A number
of the statutes also permit the articles of incorporation of a close corpora-
tion to provide for operation without a board of directors.20
In sum, state corporation statutes do not establish shareholder par-
ticipation in management as the norm, but instead contemplate manage-
ment by or under the direction of the board of directors. However,
13. See, CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990) (permits setting limits in the articles of incor-
poration requiring an action to be approved by shareholders or by outstanding shares); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b), (c) (McKinney 1986) (stating that
provision is valid where articles of incorporation were approved by all incorporators or shareholders
of record, but only if corporation's shares are not publicly traded); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT § 8.01(b) (1984); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (1969).
14. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.01(c) (1984).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
16. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.01 & official cmt. (1992); DEL. CODE ANN.,
tit. 8, § 141(a); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 35 (1969).
17. See, CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a), (b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 342, 344; MODEL STATU-
TORY CLOSE CORP. SuPP. § 3 (1984).
18. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (limiting election to corporations with no more than
35 shareholders); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 352 (limiting election of close corporation status to cor-
porations with no more than 30 shareholders). But see MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 3
& official cmt. (allowing all corporations except those having more than 50 shareholders at the time
of the election to become a close corporation) (1984).
19. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 158, 300(b)-(e); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350; MODEL STATUTORY
CLOSE CORP. SuPP. § 20 (1984).
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS, §§ 4-302, 4-303 (1985);
MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 21 (1984).
[Vol. 28:213
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modem corporation statutes provide the flexibility to tailor an alternative
management structure.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS
ON THEIR DUrIES
As discussed in the last section, the role of shareholders in the man-
agement of a corporation is generally very limited. Under the traditional
rules of corporation law, a shareholder is an investor and the corporation
is a vehicle to accumulate the funds of investors.21 Management is not
viewed as a function of investors, but rather is a separate function which
is centralized in the board of directors.22 In sum, shareholders are inves-
tors, not managers, and usually express their views on corporate manage-
ment by buying and selling shares.23 In other words, they vote with their
feet. Ultimately, however, the existence of shareholder voting rights
makes it possible for the shareholders to change managers or to transfer
their shares to a new investor who desires to install new managers.24
The separation of the functions of management and investment
creates a potential divergence in the interests of the managers of the cor-
poration and its shareholders. 25 The managers of a publicly-held corpo-
ration may own only a small percent of the corporate shares.26 If the
managers divert a dollar of corporate assets or earnings into their own
pockets, the majority of the cost will be borne by those shareholders who
are not also managers. For example, if the managers own five percent of
the corporate shares, then only five cents of every dollar they divert will
be borne by them. The other ninety-five cents will be borne by other
shareholders, presumably in the form of a reduced value for their shares.
The same analysis applies where the managers shirk their duties. If a
manager imposes costs on the corporation by shirking his or her duties,
21. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systens Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259,
261, 270 (1967).
22. Id. at 261.
23. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 396-97 (dscussing this view).
24. Id. at 406-08 (noting that voting rights allow takeovers to occur).
25. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461,
1471-74 (1989) (discussing divergencies of interest in publicly-held corporations); Daniel R. Fisehel,
The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Some Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware Corpora-
tion Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 917 (1982).
26. This separation of ownership and control in the publicly-held corporation has been exten-
sively discussed in the corporation law literature beginning with ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
While many authors have viewed the phenomenon as a source of grave concern, others have
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he or she will only have to bear a small portion of the costs. The imposi-
tion of fiduciary duties upon corporate managers operates to deter corpo-
rate managers from straying too far from the pursuit of the interests of
the shareholders as residual claimants.27 If a manager violates his or her
fiduciary duty to the corporation, the corporation or a shareholder acting
on behalf of the corporation may sue to remedy the injury.2 8
In view of the limited role that a shareholder plays in the manage-
ment of a corporation, it is not surprising that the law has generally im-
posed minimal duties upon shareholders. There is no duty even to
participate in the selection of the managers of the corporation or to vote
upon extraordinary transactions proposed by those managers.29 There
are special situations, however, where the law imposes duties upon share-
holders. Determining when these situations exist and what the duties of
a shareholder are in each situation often requires close analysis of the
role of the particular shareholder.
First, the law imposes significant duties upon a shareholder who
steps outside of the role of mere investor and either assumes or has the
option to assume the role of manager.30 Predictably, these duties are
similar to the duties imposed upon other corporate managers. Secondly,
the law prohibits the sale of votes for a consideration which is personal to
the shareholder" or the sale of a corporate office.3 2 This is because the
sale of votes or of a corporate office makes it less likely that the corporate
manager or the decision of the managers approved or disapproved by the
shareholders will benefit all investors. Or, put another way, it increases
the risk that decisions will not maximize shareholder wealth. Thirdly,
27. See John A. MacKerron, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Nexus of Contracts Cor.
poration, 40 KAN. L. REV. 679, 709-10 (1992) (fiduciary duties fill the gaps in the contract between
the shareholders and the corporate managers; the duties help define the discretion of managers).
Fiduciary duties do not operate alone to reduce agency costs. There are a number of other
factors which operate to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders and, thus, reduce
agency costs. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 18-32 (1990) (discussing a number of
constraints on management conduct); Fischel, supra note 25, at 919 (discussing market mechanisms
which minimize the divergence of managers' interests from those of shareholders).
28. See generally MacKerron, supra note 27. If a suit brought by a shareholder is successful,
the amount recovered goes to the corporate treasury, but the shareholder-plaintiff may recover his or
her legal expenses from the common fund. In theory, this avoids the "free rider" problem which
would exist if the shareholder bringing the suit had to bear all the costs involved while at the same
time sharing any benefits with the other shareholders. See Clark, supra note 10 at 786-87 (derivative
suit solves collective action problem by allowing shareholder to hire an agent to seek a collective
benefit and requiring the agent to be compensated by all shareholders if he or she succeeds).
29. See discussion infra part V.B.
30. See discussion infra parts V.E-F.
31. See discussion infra part V.D.
32. See discussion infra part VII.D.
[Vol. 28:213
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the trend in the law is to impose the duties of partners upon shareholders
in close corporations.33 The shareholders in a close corporation are com-
monly more than mere investors who contribute capital to be managed
by others. Instead, the shareholders often contribute land or equipment,
organizational skills, services, secret formulae, etc. More importantly,
they often play an active role in corporate affairs.34 In short, there is
often no clear separation of management and investment functions.
Thus, the rules applicable to partners seem more appropriate than the
rules applicable to shareholders in large publicly held corporations. 35
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF CATEGORIZING ASSETS AND
OPPORTUNITIES
It is hornbook law that a corporation is a legal entity separate from
its shareholders with the capacity to own property in its own name.36 It
is equally well-settled that shares of a corporation are the personal prop-
erty of the shareholders who may transfer the shares and retain any
gain."7 This distinction between corporate property and the property of
individual shareholders is fundamental to determining the duty of a
shareholder in many situations.
While a shareholder generally has no duty when dealing with an
asset or opportunity that belongs to him or her, he or she may be liable
when he deals with an asset or opportunity that fairly belongs to the
corporation or where his or her negligence results in injury to or loss of
corporate assets.38 For example, a controlling shareholder may not
usurp a corporate opportunity.39 Similarly, where a transfer of shares
includes compensation to the shareholder for the concomitant transfer of
a corporate asset or opportunity, liability may be imposed upon the
shareholder.' Or where shares are transferred to another under circum-
stances which suggest that the purchaser may loot corporate assets, lia-
bility may be imposed upon the seller if such looting occurs.
41
33. See discussion infra part VI.A.
34. See Manne, supra note 21, at 278. See also discussion infra part V1.
35. See discussion infra part V.A.
36. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 79 (1983).
37. See 6 ZOLMAN CAVITCH, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 113.01 (Joseph M. Lobel et al. eds.,
1992); 12 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 5452 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1991).
38. See discussion infra parts V.E, VII.B, and VII.E.
39. See discussion infra part V.E.
40. See discussion infra part VILE.
41. See discussion infra part VII.B.
1992]
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It can be argued that viewing the corporation as a person is mislead-
ing since the corporation is merely the "nexus" of a set of contracts
among various persons, such as managers, investors, employees, credi-
tors, suppliers, etc.42 However, even under a nexus of contracts ap-
proach to the corporation, the shareholders are viewed as the residual
owners of the corporation.43 In other words, the terms of their contract
entitle them to any gains that exist after the legitimate claims of other
contracting parties, including the managers, are met. The fiction of the
corporate person and the concept of corporate assets helps demarcate the
legally protected residual interest of corporate shareholders. The im-
plicit contract between shareholders and corporate managers gives the
managers extensive discretion to use corporate assets for corporate pur-
poses, but prohibits them from using such assets for personal purposes."
V. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF A SHAREHOLDER
A. In General
Absent special circumstances a shareholder does not stand in a fidu-
ciary relationship to the corporation or to other shareholders in regards
to the affairs of the corporation.45 Thus, a shareholder has no duty to
participate in shareholder meetings." In addition, a shareholder may
generally act in his or her own self-interest in voting or in granting a
42. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 27, at 7 (corporation is product of contracts among partici-
pants in the business); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1426 (1989) (personhood of corporation "is a matter of convenience rather
than reality;" corporation is disparate independent actors; the arrangements among the actors de-
pend upon contract and not the status of the corporation as a legal person); Fischel, supra note 25, at
917 (corporation is merely legal fiction which serves as nexus of contracts among individuals).
43. MacKerron, supra note 27, at 703 (shareholders are residual claimants to cash flow or
liquidation proceeds after the contract claims of other participants are satisfied); Terry A. O'Neill,
Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolu-
tion and Fiduciary Obligation in Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 646, 655 (1992) ("The
notion that shareholders are residual claimants, and not owners, is a central insight offered by the
contract theory of the firm.").
44. In this regard, it might be observed that the law recognizes that a partnership may own
property in its own name, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Aar § 8, 6 U.L.A. 1, 115 (1969), even though
the partnership is not a legal entity. Here too, attributing ownership of the assets of the business to
the business itself rather than to the owners of the business permits the enforcement of rules designed
to limit and to remedy the diversion of assets and the earnings from those assets in violation of the
implicit contract of the parties. Cf. UNIFORM PARTNERSHiP ACT § 21, 6 U.L.A. 1, 258 (1969)
(partner must account to the partnership for any benefit derived from use of partnership property
without the consent of the other partners) and id. § 25(2)(a), 6 U.L.A. at 326 (partner has right to
possess partnership property for partnership purposes, but not right to possess for any other purpose
without consent of other partners).
45. Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Minneapolis Shareholders Co., 425 F. Supp. 145, 150-51 (D.
Minn. 1977) (refusing to enter preliminary injunction to prevent shareholder from proceeding with
tender offer).
46. See discussion infra part V.B.
[Vol. 28:213
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proxy appointment,47 but is usually proscribed from selling his or her
vote.48
A controlling shareholder who enters into a transaction with the
corporation is, however, subject to a fiduciary duty of intrinsic fairness to
the corporation where the shareholder controls the transaction and dic-
tates the term.49 In addition, a controlling shareholder may not usurp
opportunities which fairly belong to the corporation' or use the power
to control the corporation in a manner that benefits herself at the expense
of the interests of the minority shareholders. 1
Finally, in some jurisdictions the case law holds that shareholders in
a closely-held corporation owe each other fiduciary duties similar to
those owed by the partners in a partnership, 52 although it is possible to
contract out of these duties.53
B. Failure or Refusal to Participate in Shareholder Meetings
Absent special circumstances, a shareholder has no obligation to at-
tend or to participate in shareholder meetings.54 Therefore, a court will
not compel a shareholder to attend a shareholder meeting in order to
ensure the existence of a quorum.5 As a result, a shareholder who holds
enough shares can exercise a stay away veto by refusing to attend meet-
ings of shareholders. In one case, for example, the holder of fifty percent
of the shares in a corporation refused to attend any shareholder meetings
in order to prevent the election of new directors.5 1 Since no new direc-
tors could be elected, the old board of directors, controlled by the recalci-
trant shareholder, continued in office.5 7 The case holds that a court may
not compel the shareholder to attend the meeting since the shareholder is
under no legal duty to attend. 8
Arguably the refusal of a shareholder to attend shareholder meet-
ings is oppressive conduct where the refusal results in a lack of a quorum
47. See discussion infra part V.C.
48. See discussion infra part V.D.
49. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
50. See discussion infra part V.E.
51. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969).
52. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975). See also discus-
sion infra part VI.A.
53. See discussion infra part VI.C.
54. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del.
1947) (noting in dicta that ownership of voting stock imposes no legal duty to vote the stock); Hall v.
Hall, 506 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
55. Hall, 506 S.W.2d at 45.
56. Id. at 43, 45.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 45.
1992]
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for the meetings.5 9 However, one case holds that the failure of the con-
trolling shareholders in a corporation to attend two special shareholder
meetings called by a minority shareholder is not oppressive conduct since
a shareholder has no affirmative duty to attend or participate in share-
holder meetings.' ° The opinion notes that the plaintiff was not injured by
the failure of the controlling shareholders to attend the meetings and that
the controlling shareholders attended the annual meeting of shareholders
three months after the meetings called by shareholders. 61 Where the re-
fusal of a controlling shareholder to attend shareholder meetings extends
over a long time period and actually causes injury to minority sharehold-
ers, a court might find that such conduct is oppressive because it defeats
reasonable expectations of the minority shareholders which were central
to their decision to join the enterprise,62 such as the expectation that they
could participate in the election of directors.63
In some states a shareholder may be able to bring an action to com-
pel an annual meeting of shareholders regardless of the refusal of a share-
holder to attend. For example, the Delaware statute provides that if the
annual meeting is not held within 30 days of the date designated for the
meeting or, if no date is designated, within 13 months of incorporation or
of the last annual meeting, "the Court of Chancery may summarily order
a meeting to be held upon the application of any stockholder or direc-
tor." 64 Similarly, the California statute permits the superior court of the
proper county to summarily order a shareholder meeting upon the appli-
cation of any shareholder if there is a failure to hold the annual meeting
for a period of 60 days after the date designated for the meeting or, if no
date is designated, for a period of 15 months from the date of organiza-
tion of the corporation or of its last annual meeting.6 Both the Califor-
nia and Delaware statutes provide that the shares present in person or by
proxy constitute a quorum for the purpose of the meeting regardless of
any provision to the contrary in the articles of incorporation or bylaws.66
59. Judicial dissolution of a corporation may be authorized if the directors or those in control
of the corporation act in an oppressive manner. See, eg., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACr
§ 14.30(2)(il) (1984); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97(a)(2)) (1969).
60. Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 359 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
61. Id.
62. Cf. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984) (involving termination of
shareholder's employment by corporation).
63. Cf. Hall v. Hall, 506 S.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (conceding that the failure of
one equal shareholder to attend the annual shareholders' meeting rendered the other shareholder's
shares impotent and injured the shareholder by "preventing her from participating in the manage-
ment of the corporation").
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (1991).
65. CAL. CORP. CODE § 600(c) (West 1990).
66. Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c).
[Vol. 28:213
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Under many modem corporation statutes the requirement of a
board of directors may be dispensed with so that a corporation may be
managed by its shareholders.67 Where management of a corporation is
placed in the hands of the shareholders, the shareholders are subject to
the duties of directors, 68 including the duty of due care.69 Case law es-
tablishes that the duty of care requires a director to attend meetings of
the board of directors as a regular practice,70 although missing a single
meeting for adequate reasons is not a breach of duty.71 Presumably
shareholders who have the power to manage a corporation's affairs are
subject to an obligation to attend shareholder meetings on a regular basis
and are not privileged to exercise a stay away veto.72
C. Voting in Self-interest
A shareholder is not disqualified from voting on a matter at a meet-
ing of shareholders merely because the shareholder has a personal inter-
est in the matter.73 Absent special circumstances a shareholder may vote
even though he or she is motivated by selfishness or by mere whimsy,74
and is not required to vote in a manner that sacrifices his or her interests
to those of the other shareholders. 75 For example, one case holds that a
majority shareholder is not disqualified from voting on the question of
67. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 351 (respectively requiring inclusion in articles
of incorporation provision for eliminating board of directors, and allowing statutory close corpora-
tions to be managed by shareholders if articles of incorporation so provide); REVISED MODEL BusI-
NESS CORP. AcT § 8.01(c) (1984) (allowing corporations with 50 or fewer shareholders to dispense
with board of directors as long as articles of incorporation so provide).
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 351; MODEL BUSINESs CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.01 official
cmt. (3d ed. 1992).
69. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.30(a)(2) (defining director's duty of care)
(1984).
70. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981).
71. Id.; Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (noting that director had attended
the first of two meetings and holding that he had an adequate excuse for his missing the second).
72. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Gearing v. Kelly, 182 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y.
1962), in which a director refused to attend board meeting to prevent a quorum. Directors are also
obliged to obtain a rudimentary understanding of the corporation's business and to keep informed
about the activities of the corporation. See Francis, 432 A.2d at 821-22 (explaining duties of corpo-
rate director).
73. Windmuller v. Standard Distilling & Distrib. Co., 114 F. 491, 493-94 (D.N.J. 1902) (per-
mitting shareholder who had guaranteed dividends of corporation to vote on proposed dissolution);
Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Kirwan v. Parkway Distillery, 148 S.W.2d 720, 723-24 (Ky.
1941); Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., 516 A.2d 132, 136 (Vt. 1986).
74. Heil v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 151 A. 303, 304 (Del. Ch. 1930) (holding that share-
holder could not be sued for conspiracy solely for voting to purchase the assets of another
corporation).
75. See Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1123-24 (addressing merger between parent and subsidiary corpo-
ration); Kentucky Package Store v. Checani, 117 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1954) (reviewing shareholder
vote on whether corporation should repurchase the shares of the majority shareholder).
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whether the corporation should exercise an option to purchase her
shares.7 6 Further, a majority shareholder is not disqualified from voting
on the question of whether the corporation should merge with the major-
ity shareholder.77 Similarly, a shareholder may vote on a question of
corporate policy even though he or she is related to someone who favors
or opposes the policy.
78
The rule that a shareholder may vote in his or her self-interest does
not prevent a court from reviewing a transaction which requires the ap-
proval of shareholders where a shareholder is on both sides of the trans-
action.79 A controlling shareholder has a fiduciary duty to deal fairly
with the corporation in any transactions with it.8" Thus, a majority
shareholder does not have the power in his or her capacity as shareholder
to ratify a sale of corporate assets to himself or herself at an inadequate
price 1 or to ratify a sale of his property to the corporation on unfair
terms. 2 Similarly, a court may review the fairness of merger between a
corporation and a controlling shareholder in spite of shareholder ap-
proval of the merger.8 3 In jurisdictions which hold that shareholders in
close corporations owe each other fiduciary duties similar to those owed
by partners in a partnership, 4 a court may review transactions approved
by shareholders to determine whether the transaction represents a breach
of fiduciary duties.8"
In summary, the rule that a shareholder is not disqualified from vot-
ing because of self-interest is rule of convenience. First, a rule requiring
disqualification due to self-interest would be unworkable when applied to
many closely-held corporations. 86 In these corporations many decisions
76. Kentucky Package Store, 117 N.E.2d at 141-42.
77. Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1123-24.
78. Du Pont v Du Pont, 256 F. 129, 185 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 642 (1919).
79. See, eg., Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., 516 A.2d 132 (Vt. 1986) (addressing purchase of corpo-
rate assets by a shareholder).
80. See discussion infra part V.F. Cf. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.01 (Proposed Final Draft 1992) (expounding duties of loyalty
of directors, senior executives, and controlling shareholders) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
81. See Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Yerkes, 30 N.E. 667 (Ill. 1892).
82. Cf Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 25 N.E. 201 (N.Y. 1890) (ordering new trial at
which trial court should examine whether discrepancy between price of sale ratified by majority of
disinterested shareholders and value of the property to the corporation was so great that it should be
condemned as fraud).
83. See, eg., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
84. See discussion infra part VI.A, B.
85. See Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., 516 A.2d 132 (Vt. 1986) (holding that under Massachusetts
law, the sale of assets to a shareholder which was approved by three of the four principle sharehold-
ers after a discussion and the rejection of various alternatives did not constitute breach of fiduciary
duties).
86. Stevens v. Richardson, 755 P.2d 389, 394-95 (Alaska 1988).
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have a financial impact on shareholders. Requiring disqualification of
interested shareholders would often give minority shareholders a veto
power over corporate action.87 Second, it is easier for a court to "ex-
amine, appraise, and adjust the fairness of the ultimate results, than it is
to attempt to divine and adjudicate the validity of the complex factors
that motivate shareholder voting."88 Similar considerations apply to the
decision of a shareholder to appoint a proxy.89
While shareholders may vote in their own self-interest, they gener-
ally may not sell their votes.90 In addition, there is "radical difference"
when a shareholder-director is voting as a director; a director must act
for the benefit of all shareholders and may not act for his or her personal
benefit at the expense of the other shareholders. 91 The distinction be-
tween actions as a shareholder and as a director is illustrated by a case
which holds that a director who votes in favor of a sale of corporate
assets may vote against the proposal as a shareholder and seek an ap-
praisal of his or her shares.92 Even where the sale is in the best interests
of the corporation, the shareholder-director has no fiduciary duty to vote
his or her shares for the benefit of the corporation and other
shareholders.93
Some corporation statutes provide that the votes of interested share-
holders are not counted in determining whether a transaction in which a
director has a conflicting interest is immune from attack on the basis of
that conflict of interest.94
87. Id. In Stevens, a real estate commission was paid to an officer-director-shareholder. The
court rejected a rule requiring disqualification of that shareholder because it would give veto power
to the minority and lead to unfairness.
88. Earl Sneed, The Shareholder May Vote as He Pleases: Theory and Fact, 22 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 23, 41-42 (1960). See also Stevens, 755 P.2d at 395.
89. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 251 F. 937, 945 (D. Del. 1918) (refusing to inquire into the motive of
shareholders in appointing proxies), aff'd as modified, 256 F. 129 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S.
642 (1919).
90. See discussion of selling votes,, infra part V.D.
91. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 45 (3rd Cir. 1947).
92. Waters v. Double L, Inc., 769 P.2d 582, 584 (Idaho 1989).
93. Id. at 583-84.
94. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(1) (West 1990) REVISED MODEL BUSINEss CORP. ACT§§ 8.61(b)(2), 8.63 (1984) (amending and replacing former §§ 8.31 and 8.32);. Some states have
enacted control share statutes that prohibit an acquirer of a threshold level of shares from voting
those shares without the approval of the shareholders of the target corporation. In addition, some
states have enacted business combination statutes that prohibit an acquirer of a threshold level of
shares from entering into certain business transactions with the corporation unless specified condi-
tions are met. See generally Evelyn Sroufe & Catherine Gelband, Business Combination Statutes" A
"Meaningful Opportunity" For Success?, 45 Bus. LAw. 891 (1990).
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D. Selling Votes
Generally a contract in which voting rights are sold for a considera-
tion personal to the shareholder is against public policy and not en-
forced.95 In addition, an action may be brought to enjoin the voting of
shares pursuant to such an agreement96 or to disallow votes cast pursu-
ant to the agreement. 97 A contract in which a shareholder receives con-
sideration personal to the shareholder in return for not voting or
participating in corporate affairs is subject to the same rules as a contract
to sell votes.9 8
The improper consideration promised or provided to a shareholder
in return for his or her vote can include money,99 employment by the
corporation, 1°° employment of a family member by the corporation,10' or
any further consideration personal to the shareholder.10 2  In fact, one
author argues that a "standstill agreement" in which an entity that owns
shares in a corporation agrees to vote the shares in elections of directors
in the manner directed by the management of the corporation in return
for representation on the board of directors, securities registration rights,
and/or other consideration constitutes the illegal sale of votes. 103
95. Dieckmann v. Robyn, 141 S.W. 717, 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (sustaining grant of demur-
rer in suit by shareholder seeking promised consideration). See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 609(e)
(McKinney 1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 cmt. a (1981).
96. Macht v. Merchants Mortgage Credit Co., 194 A. 19, 22 (Del. Ch. 1937).
97. Chew v. Inverness Management Corp., 352 A.2d 426, 429-30 (Del. Ch. 1976) (ruling on
action to determine validity of election of board of directors).
98. See Brady v. Bean, 221 Il. App. 279, 283-84 (1921) (disallowing as contrary to public
policy a sale whose only supporting consideration was shareholder's agreement to make no further
objection to a sale of corporate property).
99. Macht, 194 A. at 22 (finding that preferred shareholders were paid money in return for
depositing their shares with a "protective committee").
100. Cones Ex'rs v. Russell, 21 A. 847, 848 (N.J. Ch. 1891) (employment as manager of corpora-
tion for a fixed term at a fixed salary).
101. See, eg., Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, 146 A.2d 602, 613 (Del. Ch. 1958) (among
other things, employment of son was conditioned upon delivery of votes of his mother's shares),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 163 A.2d 288 (Del. 1960).
102. Id. See also Chew v. Inverness Management Corp., 352 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1976) (holding
that in sale of shares with a negative book value, proxies given in return for ten cents per share for an
option to buy the shares at prices of from $20 to $80 was improper consideration); Dieckmann v.
Robyn, 141 S.W. 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (ruling that promise to pay one-half of all money in
excess of $12,500 less commission paid by corporation for land sold to it by the defendant was
improper consideration).
103. Steven A. Baranoff, Note, The Standstill Agreement: A Case of Illegal Vote Selling and a
Breach of FiduciaryDuty, 93 YALE L. J. 1093 (1984). But cf Henley Group, Inc. v. Sante Fe S. Pac.
Corp., No. Civ. A. 9569, 1988 WL 23945 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 1988) (holding that no vote buying
occurred because shareholder was free to withdraw support and because no legal obligation com-
pelled shareholder to vote for management's slate of directors).
Some authors have argued that a person who is seeking control of a large corporation should be
permitted to purchase the proxies of shareholders, subject to specified limits, as an alternative to a
traditional proxy fight or tender offer. See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the
[Vol. 28:213
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The sale of votes in return for a consideration personal to the selling
shareholder is against public policy because it is viewed as a breach of
duty to the other shareholders." ° In theory, each shareholder in a cor-
poration is protected by the tendency of other shareholders to "promote
the best interests of all, in order to promote his individual interests [as a
shareholder]."' 5 The shareholder who sells his or her vote gives up the
right to exercise discretion on the question of how to vote and, conse-
quently, other shareholders may be injured.
However, injury to the corporation or to the other shareholders is
not the inevitable effect of vote selling.'0 6 Therefore, an agreement in
which a shareholder exchanges his or her vote in return for a considera-
tion personal to the shareholder should not be per se invalid, but rather
should merely be subject to a rebuttable presumption of invalidity. 07
The agreement should be valid if it is intrinsically fair to the other share-
holders or if it is approved by a majority of the independent shareholders
after full disclosure of all material facts. 0 s In addition, where all share-
holders consent to the vote selling transaction, 1 9 the agreement is
enforceable.
A significant Delaware case holds that an agreement involving the
sale of votes is not per se invalid." 0 The case involved a proposed
merger between two corporations. A shareholder of one of the corpora-
tions held all the shares of one class of shares and consequently had the
power under the corporation's articles of incorporation to block the
merger by voting against it. The shareholder opposed the merger be-
cause it would impose a large income tax burden on it. In order to over-
come the resistance of this shareholder, the corporation in which the
shareholder owned shares provided the shareholder with a loan so that it
could avoid the adverse tax consequences of the merger by exercising
Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 535 (1990); Clark,
supra note 10.
104. See Macht v. Merchants Mortgage Credit Co., 194 A. 19, 22 (Del. Ch. 1937) ("in fraud of
the other stockholders"); Dieckmann v. Robyn, 141 S.W. 717, 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (finding
constructive fraud on the corporation and the other shareholders); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 193 cmt. a (1981) (promise violates or tends to induce violation of fiduciary duties).
105. Cones Ex'rs v. Russell, 21 A. 847, 849 (N.J. Ch. 1891).
106. See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982) (finding that purpose of the chal-
lenged agreement was to benefit all shareholders).
107. Id. at 25-26; Michael D. Schmitz, Comment, Shareholder Vote Buying-A Rebuttable Pre-
sumption of Illegality," 1968 WIs. L. REv. 927.
108. Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 26-27.
109. Keady v. United Rys. Co., 108 P. 197, 200 (Or. 1910). Cf Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641,
643 (N.Y. 1936) (upholding agreement between the two shareholders in a corporation against the
argument that it invaded the powers of the board of directors).
110. Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 25.
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certain warrants. The loan was contingent upon a vote of the other
shareholders, who overwhelmingly approved it after disclosure of all ma-
terial facts."1 ' The court held that the sale of votes by a shareholder is
not per se invalid, but rather is "a voidable transaction subject to a test
for intrinsic fairness," and is susceptible to ratification by a majority of
the independent shareholders.' 12
The holding in the case is sensible. The shareholder receiving the
loan in return for not opposing the merger is entitled to vote in its own
interest and against the merger. 1 3 The wealth of shareholders as a group
is maximized by a rule which upholds the vote selling arrangement where
the other shareholders, after full disclosure, ratify it or where it is proven
that all shareholders benefit from the transaction.
An agreement by a shareholder to vote in a certain manner solely in
return for a benefit "that will accrue to all shareholders through the own-
ership of shares" is not invalid as against public policy.'1 4 For example,
where a shareholder of a corporation that is in financial difficulty agrees
to vote for a person as a director in return for a sizeable loan to the
corporation, the agreement is enforceable."' The arrangement benefits
all the shareholders of the corporation and, in addition, it is not unrea-
sonable for the lender to desire the ability to protect his or her interest as
a creditor."16
An agreement solely among shareholders to vote their shares in a
particular manner in order "to obtain the advantages of concerted ac-
tion" is not vote selling and is not against public policy." 7 In fact, most
modern corporation statutes expressly authorize such shareholder voting
agreements. 118
E. Fiduciary Duties of a Controlling Shareholder
A shareholder who exercises control over or "dominates" a corpora-
tion's affairs is a fiduciary.' 19 A controlling shareholder performs the
111. Id. at 20.
112. Id. at 26.
113. See discussion infra part V.C.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 cmt. a, illus. 3 (1981).
115. Reilly v. Korholz, 320 P.2d 756, 759-60 (Colo. 1958) (finding alternatively that even if the
challenged provision relating to voting was against public policy, it was severable).
116. Id. at 760.
117. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del.
1947); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 illus. 3 (1981).
118. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(a) (McKin-
ney 1986); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.31 (1984); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 34 (1969).
119. Maggiore v. Bradford, 310 F.2d 519, 521 (6th Cir. 1962); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125
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function of and is subject to the duties of a director. 120 In other words,
he or she is more than a mere investor. If a controlling shareholder is not
subject to a fiduciary duty, "then the minority are in a situation that
exposes them to the grossest frauds and subjects them to most outrageous
wrongs." 12' Thus, a shareholder who controls a corporation is subject to
a fiduciary duty not to use control over the corporation to obtain a bene-
fit at the expense of the corporation or the minority shareholders. 122 For
example, where a parent corporation enters into a contract with a subsid-
iary, breaches the contract, and causes the subsidiary to refrain from en-
forcing the contract, the parent corporation must prove that its actions
were intrinsically fair to the subsidiary.123 Where the breach involves
failure of the parent to make timely payments and failure to order the
minimum quantities required by the contract, the parent receives a bene-
fit to the detriment of the minority shareholders and must account for
the damages caused by its breach of contract.' 24
As a fiduciary, a controlling shareholder may not, for example:
(1) usurp corporate opportunities belonging to the corporation; 25 (2) use
corporate assets to pay for the purchase of shares; 26 (3) appropriate the
F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942). See also PRINCIPLES, supra note 80,§ 5.11.
120. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding
that E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. did not exercise sufficient control over General Motors to
impose a fiduciary duty upon it as a dominant shareholder), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971).
Where a shareholder holds shares with less than a majority voting power, proof of actual exer-
cise of control by the shareholder is necessary to establish that he or she is a controlling shareholder.
See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 122-23 (Del. Ch. 1971); PRINCIPLES, supra note 72,
§ 1.10 (defining "controlling shareholder"). However, the mere fact that a shareholder joins in a
majority vote does not make him or her a controlling shareholder. See Stringer v. Car Data Sys.,
Inc., 821 P.2d 418, 419-20 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), in which 32 shareholders were able to outvote four
other shareholders by 57% to 43% on an issue.
Additionally, a large shareholder who is making a hostile bid for the corporation's shares is
clearly not a controlling shareholder and thus has no fiduciary duties to other shareholders. In re
Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders' Litig., No. Civ. A. 8453, 1988 WL 49126 at *2-3 (Del. Ch. May 13,
1988).
121. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1923) (explain-
ing that when majority shareholders determine the policy of the corporation "they are, for the mo-
ment, the corporation").
122. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971).
123. Id
124. Id.
125. Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 518-19 (Del. Ch. 1978) (relying on Equity Corp. v.
Milton, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (Del. 1986), and denying summary judgment because fact issue existed as
to whether a corporate opportunity was usurped); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, 249 A.2d
427, 434-35 (Del. Ch. 1968); PRINCIPLES, supra note 80, § 5.12.
126. Maggiore v. Bradford, 310 F.2d 519, 521-22 (6th Cir. 1962) (holding that in a derivative
suit, rescission of a transaction before the court had an opportunity to decide the merits of the case
did not defeat the right of minority shareholders to recover attorneys' fees), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
934 (1963).
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going concern value of a profitable corporation by, for example, dissolv-
ing the corporation and purchasing its assets; 127 (4) use its voting power
to amend the articles of incorporation to benefit one class of shareholders
at the expense of another in order to further its own interests; 121 (5) use
its control over the corporation to appropriate the value of appreciated
corporate assets to the exclusion of the other shareholders; 129 or (6) time
a corporate action or transaction so as to injure the minority sharehold-
ers while benefiting the controlling shareholder."1
While an action that benefits the controlling shareholder and harms
the corporation or the minority shareholders is subject to a test of intrin-
sic fairness, an action that benefits all shareholders on a pro rata basis is
subject to the business judgment rule."' Thus, the decision of a subsidi-
ary corporation to declare a lawful dividend in excess of its current earn-
ings, allegedly because of the parent corporation's need for cash is subject
to the business judgment rule where the minority shareholders receive a
proportionate share of the funds. 132
Some authority suggests that it is a breach of fiduciary duty for a
controlling shareholder to use his or her control over the corporation to
obtain a benefit that is not available to other shareholders even where
there is no harm to the minority shareholders. 133 In one well-known case
the majority shareholders in a savings and loan transferred their shares
to a holding corporation in exchange for shares of the holding corpora-
tion. 34 The minority shareholders were not offered an opportunity to
exchange their shares. The holding corporation, which held over 85% of
the shares of the savings and loan, then made public offers of its shares.
Since the book value of the savings and loan shares was very high, the
availability of the lower priced shares of the holding company apparently
127. Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369, 372-73 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675
(1942).
128. See Maxwell v. Northwest Indus., 339 N.Y.S.2d 347, 356-57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (vote to
increase dividend rate paid to preferred shareholders in order to promote interest of parent
corporation).
129. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947).
130. Smith v. SPNV Holdings, Inc., No. Civ. A. 8395, 1987 WL 14676 at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28,
1987) (denying motion to dismiss because timing of freeze-out merger resulted in loss of $8 million
dividend by minority shareholders).
131. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971).
132. Id. at 720-22. The court noted in dicta that where a corporation has two classes of shares,
one held by the controlling shareholder or parent corporation and the other by minority sharehold-
ers, the declaration of a dividend on only the class held by the majority shareholder might be subject
to the intrinsic fairness test. Id. at 721.
133. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 80, § 5.1l(a)(2). The receipt of a premium price for controlling
shares is not, however, a violation of a controlling shareholder's fiduciary duties. See discussion
infra part VII.C.
134. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 467 (Cal. 1969) (en bane).
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decreased in the marketability of minority's shares in the savings and
loan.135 Eventually the holding corporation offered to exchange its
shares for those of the minority shareholders in the savings and loan, but
on terms much less favorable than those received by the majority
shareholders."3 6
The case holds that majority shareholders "may not use their power
to control corporate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner
detrimental to the minority."' 37 The power to control the corporation,
according to the court, must be used "to benefit all shareholders propor-
tionately .... 138 The court was troubled by the fact that the majority
shareholders formed a holding corporation in order to create a market
for the shares of the savings and loan instead of simply splitting the sav-
ings and loan's shares.' 39 Thus, the creation of the savings and loan took
the place of a corporate transaction for the benefit of all the corporation's
shareholders. The court concluded that the majority had a duty to offer
the minority an opportunity to exchange their shares in the savings and
loan for shares in the holding corporation on the terms available to the
majority shareholders. While the case includes broad statements regard-
ing the use of control to benefit all shareholders, the opinion suggests
that the actions of the majority shareholders actually injured the minor-
ity shareholders by destroying any market for their shares in the savings
and loan.14
Most cases finding breach of fiduciary duty by a controlling share-
holder involve an element of harm to the minority shareholders.' 4 ' An
exception is found in several cases holding that a parent corporation may
not retain the entire tax savings which result from the filing of a consoli-
dated return with its subsidiary.'42
135. It at 476.
136. The majority shareholders received 250 shares in the holding corporation for each share in
the savings and loan. Id at 467. The minority shareholders were offered 51 shares for each share of
the savings and loan. Id. at 468.
137. Id. at 471.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 475.
140. Id. at 476.
141. Cf. Crain v. Elec. Memories & Magnetics Corp., 123 Cal. Rptr. 419, 427-28 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975) (holding that complaint stated cause of action by alleging that majority shareholder generated
for its own purposes substantial cash from sale of corporate assets and left plaintiffs locked into
ownership of a shell corporation).
142. See In re Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymouth corp., 473 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1973) (hold-
ing that in bankruptcy case, parent corporation was unjustly enriched where refund arose from
subsidiary's losses), cerL denied sub nom., Western Dealer Management v. England, 412 U.S. 919
(1973); Smith v. Tele-Communication, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 571, 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that complaint stated cause of action and that parent corporation bore burden of proving inherent
fairness of allocating entire savings to itself). But see Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246
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F. Self-Dealing by a Controlling Shareholder
A controlling shareholder who causes the corporation to enter into a
transaction with himself or herself is under a duty of intrinsic fairness
towards the corporation.143 If the transaction is challenged, the control-
ling shareholder bears the burden of showing that the transaction is in-
trinsically fair to the corporation" unless it is approved by the
disinterested minority shareholders after full disclosure of all material
facts regarding the transaction and the controlling shareholder's interest
in it. Approval of the transaction by the disinterested minority share-
holders after full disclosure shifts the burden of proof to any shareholder
who challenges it."5 A fact is material to a transaction "'if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it im-
portant in deciding how to vote.' "146
One form of controlling shareholder is the parent corporation. Con-
tracts between parent and subsidiary corporation, therefore, are subject
to an intrinsic fairness test. 47 In addition, mergers between a parent and
a subsidiary corporation are subject to scrutiny under the intrinsic fair-
ness test. 148 If the contract or merger is approved by the disinterested
minority shareholders after full disclosure of all material facts, the bur-
den of proving that the transaction is unfair shifts to the shareholder
challenging it.49 However, the parent corporation as controlling share-
holder bears the burden of proving that all material facts were
revealed. 150
The business judgment rule applies to a transaction between a con-
trolling shareholder and a corporation where the terms of the transaction
A.2d 789, 792-94 (Del. Ch. 1967) (holding that it is impossible to set fair standards for allocation
since that question is one of business judgment); Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 204 N.E.2d 643, 647
(N.Y. 1965) (finding no loss or disadvantage to subsidiary, and that subsidiary benefitted from dis-
puted agreement).
143. Seventeen Stone Corp. v. General Tel. Co., 204 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (majority
shareholder allegedly purchased $14,000,000 of shares for $7,000,000); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (involving parent corporation). See also PRINCIPLES, supra note 80,
§ 5.10.
144. Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720.
145. Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 957-59 (Del. Ch. 1980) (approval by 96% of
shares voted after full disclosure); PRINCIPLEs, supra note 80, § 5.10(b). Approval by the disinter-
ested outside directors may have the same effect. See Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch.
1971) (transaction between corporation and holders of 44% of shares; valuation by majority of in-
dependent directors assisted by independent experts; business judgment test applied).
146. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (quoting TSC Indus. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
147. See, eg., Trans World Airlines v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. Ch. 1977).
148. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
149. Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
150. Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
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are determined by competitive bidding or where the transaction involves
fungible goods or services offered to the general public by the shareholder
at terms fixed in advance.151 Similarly, where the terms of a transaction
between a controlling shareholder and the corporation are set by the
state or federal government rather than by the shareholder, the transac-
tion is subject to the business judgment rule and not the intrinsic fairness
test. 152 The fact that specific transactions are approved as fair by the
state or federal government does not, however, immunize from review
under the intrinsic fairness test the policy of a parent corporation of
treating a subsidiary corporation as a captive market. The approval of a
specific transaction or series of transactions does not import approval of
a policy of denying a subsidiary the opportunity to choose when and with
whom to contract.1 53 Thus, a corporation that treats its subsidiary as a
captive market for the sale of airplanes is required to account for any
damages to the subsidiary resulting from the inability of the subsidiary to
obtain needed aircraft from other sources. The fact that the parent even-
tually sells airplanes to the subsidiary on fair terms approved by the fed-
eral government does not prevent application of the intrinsic fairness test
to the policy of the parent.154
The business judgment rules also applies to a transaction between a
large shareholder and the corporation where the shareholder does not
control the corporation. 55 One case holds that a shareholder who
owned 23% of the shares in General Motors Corporation and designated
five of its thirty-four directors was not a controlling shareholder. Thus,
transactions between the shareholder and the corporation were not sub-
ject to the intrinsic fairness test.1 56 However, a shareholder who does not
have absolute control by virtue of ownership of a majority of voting
shares may still have working control by virtue of a substantial minority
151. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 80, § 5.10 cmt. c. See also Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.) cert denied, 403
U.S. 911 (1971).
152. Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970); Trans World Airlines v.
Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 10-12 (Del. Ch. 1977).
153. Trans World Airlines, 374 A.2d at 12.
154. Id. See also Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 540 A.2d 403, 407-09 (Del. 1988)
(affirming lower court findings on amount of damages caused by policy of treating subsidiary as a
captive market).
155. See, eg., Gottesmann, 279 F. Supp. at 383-84 (imposing fiduciary duty only where share-
holder dominates affairs of corporation).
156. The court also held that the transactions in question were fair since they were negotiated in
the same manner as any similar transaction. Thus, the corporation paid no more than the price
available from other suppliers, and the quality of the goods and services was at least equal to that
offered by other sources. Id at 385.
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share interest combined with control over the corporation's proxy ma-
chinery.157 Whether a shareholder has working control is therefore a
question of fact.
158
VI. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF A SHAREHOLDER IN A CLOSELY-HELD
CORPORATION
A. The Duty and Its Limits
The closely-held corporation is usually an intimate business rela-
tionship that bears a greater resemblance to a partnership than to a pub-
licly held corporation. 59 "[Close corporations frequently originate in
the context of relationships personal in nature, often undertaken by fam-
ily members or friends.""16 The minority shareholder in a closely-held
corporation often invests a substantial amount of time or money in the
business, and may rely heavily on the expectation of a return on this
investment in the form of a salary or dividends.161 Unfortunately, how-
ever, a minority shareholder in a closely-held corporation is more vulner-
able to oppression by the majority shareholder than minority
shareholders in publicly-held corporations.1 62 Unlike shareholders in a
corporation whose shares are publicly traded, a minority shareholder in a
closely-held corporation by definition has no ready market for the sale of
his or her shares and, thus, cannot escape an oppressive situation
through the sale of the shares.1 63
In recognition of the plight of minority shareholders in closely-held
corporations and the resemblance of a closely-held corporation to a part-
nership, the clear trend in the case law is to impose on the shareholders
in a closely-held corporation fiduciary duties analogous to those owed by
a partner in a partnership.16 In the leading case of Donahue v. Rodd
157. See Adolf A. Bele, Jr., "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (1958)
(discussing working control).
158. Cf Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962) (upholding contract
calling for resignation and replacement of board in connection with purchase of shares as not against
public policy if shares represented working control).
159. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975).
160. Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 171 (Miss. 1989).
161. See, eg., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
162. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513-15.
163. Id. at 514.
164. See, eg., Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Hagshenas v. Gaylord,
557 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 561 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1990); Donahue, 328 N.E.2d 505;
Fought, 543 So. 2d 167; Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Haskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359 (Mont. 1990) (duty
not violated on facts of case); 68th Street Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78 (N.J. Super.
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Electrotype Co.,165 a group of shareholders owning enough shares to con-
trol a closely-held corporation caused it to repurchase 45 shares for $800
per share. The shares were purchased from the father of three sharehold-
ers in the controlling group. The minority shareholders in the corpora-
tion offered to sell their shares to the corporation on the same terms
given to the father of the other shareholders, but were informed that the
corporation would not purchase the shares. The minority shareholders
then brought suit, seeking rescission of the share repurchase.
The case holds that the shareholders in a closely-held corporation
"owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation
of the enterprise that partners owe to one another." 166 According to the
court, this duty is a strict duty of good faith and loyalty.1 67 The court
found that this duty is violated when a member of the controlling group
of shareholders is given an opportunity to sell his or her shares to the
corporation while a minority shareholder is denied an equal opportunity
to sell a ratable number of shares.' 68 The member of the controlling
group is provided benefits not available to the minority, namely a market
for his or her shares and access to corporate assets for personal use.1
69
The court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of
appropriate relief which, according to the court, may be either rescission
of the share repurchase or purchase by the corporation of the shares of
the minority shareholders at a price of $800 per share.171
Several post-Donahue decisions also deal with the propriety of share
repurchases by a closely-held corporation. In one case, a shareholder in
a closely-held corporation caused the corporation to repurchase the
shares of another shareholder in order to perpetuate his control of the
corporation by preventing the purchase of the shares by a third share-
holder.1 71 The court held that the duty of good faith required the corpo-
ration to authorize the repurchase of the shares of the third shareholder
1976), aff'd, 374 A.2d 1222 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1977) (per curiam); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco
Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
Of course, no fiduciary duties are owed to a shareholder after he or she sells his or her shares.
Gangnes v. Lang, 799 P.2d 670, 672 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
165. 328 N.E.2d 505.
166. Id. at 515 (footnote omitted).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 520.
169. Id at 518-19.
170. Id at 520-21.
171. Comolli v. Comolli, 246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978).
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on the same basis as the other shares. 172 In another case minority share-
holders in a closely-held corporation filed suit against the majority share-
holders and the corporation alleging that the corporation had
repurchased shares owned by the majority shareholders at an excessive
price. 173 The court reversed the dismissal of the complaint by the lower
court.174 It agreed with the court in Donahue that the failure to provide
all shareholders with an equal opportunity to sell their shares to the cor-
poration provides the majority shareholders with benefits unavailable to
the minority and is a breach of the majority shareholders' fiduciary
duty. 175
While Donahue and the cases discussed above seem to adopt a per se
rule that the minority shareholders in a closely-held corporation are enti-
tled to an equal opportunity to sell their shares to the corporation, 176 one
post-Donahue case has rejected a per se approach.177 In this case a
closely-held corporation had voting common shares owned equally by
two shareholders as well as nonvoting common shares owned by the
holders of the voting shares and by several others. In order to avoid
dissolution of the corporation by one of the two holders of voting com-
mon shares, a third person purchased all the voting shares and a portion
of the nonvoting shares of the shareholder favoring dissolution. As part
of the arrangement, the corporation purchased the remainder of the
shareholder's nonvoting shares. A holder of nonvoting shares brought
suit, arguing that the corporation was obligated to purchase her shares as
well.
The court rejected a per se equal opportunity rule. 178 It stated that
all relevant factors must be considered in determining whether a selective
share repurchase by the corporation is a breach of duty, and that one
relevant factor is the purpose of the repurchase. 179 There is no breach of
fiduciary duty, according to the court, if the directors reasonably con-
clude that it is in the best interests of the shareholders to repurchase the
shares of a particular shareholder in order to avoid the possibility of an
involuntary dissolution.1 0
172. Id. at 281.
173. Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
174. Id. at 618.
175. Id.at 619. The opinion also states that the directors have a fiduciary duty to buy shares for
the corporation at the lowest available price. Id.
176. See also Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)
(appearing to adopt a per se rule).
177. Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642 (Md. 1985).
178. Id. at 650.
179. Id.
180. Id at 652.
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Other cases since Donahue indicate that a court should consider not
only the effect of a corporate action on minority shareholders but also
any business justification for the action. Another leading case decided by
the same court as Donahue is Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home."8 I The
corporation involved had four equal shareholders who were all employed
by the corporation at set salaries. The corporation never declared a divi-
dend. After the relations between the shareholders became strained, one
of the shareholders was not selected as a director or as an officer, and was
informed that his services were no longer desired. The net result was to
deny the shareholder any return from his investment.18 2
The court expressed concern that standard enunciated in Donahue
might unduly restrict legitimate actions of majority shareholders in man-
aging the corporation. It determined that when an action by a majority
shareholder is challenged as a breach of the strict duty of good faith, the
majority shareholder is entitled to demonstrate a legitimate business pur-
pose for its action.1 83 If the majority shareholder advances a legitimate
business purpose for the action, then the minority shareholders may
"demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could have been
achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the mi-
nority's interest."' 84 The court found that no business purpose was
shown for terminating the shareholder after he invested over fifteen years
in the corporation with the expectation that the policy of employing each
shareholder would continue.18 5
In summary, the Wilkes case modifies the Donahue decision by per-
mitting the majority shareholder to show a legitimate business purpose
for an action that is challenged as a breach of fiduciary duties. Since the
majority shareholders in Donahue did not suggest a legitimate business
purpose for the selective repurchase of corporate shares, the result in the
case would not change under the standard announced in Wilkes.
B. Some Specific Applications of the Duty
As discussed above, the fiduciary duty of a shareholder in a closely-
181. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
182. Id. at 664.
183. Id. at 663.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 663-64.
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held corporation can be breached by selective repurchases by the corpo-
ration of its shares or by the termination of the employment of a share-
holder-employee.1 86 The case law indicates that the duty may be violated
by other types of behavior including: (1) purchasing the shares of another
shareholder in violation of a share redemption agreement among the
shareholders;187 (2) causing the corporation to favor entities owned by
one shareholder over those owned by another shareholder in paying the
debts owed by the corporation;188 (3) causing the corporation to breach
its contract with a corporation owned by another shareholder; 8 9 (4) issu-
ing shares in order to upset the balance of control agreed upon by the
shareholders; 190 (5) purchasing corporate shares without disclosing to
another shareholder the availability of corporate shares and affording the
other shareholder the opportunity to purchase a portion of the shares,
where the purchase of the shares upsets an agreed upon control struc-
ture; 9 ' or (6) causing the corporation to pay constructive dividends to
some shareholders without permitting other shareholders to participate
in the payments. 192
A shareholder in a close corporation may bring a cause of action
alleging a breach of fiduciary duties by another shareholder even where
the complaining shareholder is entitled to seek dissolution of the corpo-
ration under the applicable corporation statute. 193 In an appropriate
case, even a minority shareholder in a close corporation is liable for
breach of the fiduciary duty of strict good faith. For example, in one case
a closely-held corporation had four equal shareholders, each of whom
had a veto power over corporate decisions. 194 One of the four minority
shareholders used his veto to prevent the corporation from distributing
any earnings as dividends. As a result, the corporation was subject to a
tax penalty for unreasonably accumulating earnings and also incurred
186. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d 505 (selective share repurchase); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d 657 (termi-
nation of shareholder-employee). See also discussion supra part VI.A.
187. Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 1989).
188. Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849 (Mass. 1988).
189. 68th Street Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78 (N.J. Super. 1976), aff'd, 374 A.2d
1222 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1977) (per curiam).
190. Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 385 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (holding by implication
that the control gained by the issuance of shares was used to discharge two shareholder-employees,
thus denying them any return from the corporation).
191. Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). See generally
discussion infra part VIII.
192. Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980) (remanding matter to trial court
for a determination of whether constructive dividends were paid).
193. See Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853-54 (Mass. 1988) (complaint by 50 percent
shareholder).
194. Smith v. Atlantic Properties, 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
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legal fees related to the penalty taxes. The unreasonable refusal of the
shareholder to permit the payment of dividends was held to be a viola-
tion of the minority shareholder's fiduciary duty, rendering him liable to
the corporation for its out-of-pocket expenditures for the penalty taxes
and related lawyers' fees.19 The case shows that the actions of a minor-
ity shareholder in a close corporation can inflict serious damage on a
majority shareholder. Such actions constitute a breach of fiduciary duty
by the minority shareholder where taken in bad faith.196
The actions of a shareholder in a closely-held corporation are not a
breach of fiduciary duty, in spite of an adverse impact on another share-
holder, where there is a legitimate business justification for the action and
the shareholder who is affected is unable to show the availability of less
harmful alternative course of action.1 97 Thus, one case holds that it is
not a violation of fiduciary duty for a shareholder of a corporation to buy
the corporate assets for a dollar where the corporation is financially dis-
tressed, the shareholder agrees to assume all the liabilities of the corpora-
tion, the purchaser is a minority shareholder, the purchase is approved
by two of the other three shareholders, and alternative courses of action
are considered and rejected.198 Under the circumstances, the sale of the
corporate assets to the shareholder is a legitimate and reasonable busi-
ness decision.199
In addition, a shareholder in a closely-held corporation is not under
a fiduciary duty to purchase the shares of a deceased shareholder or to
cause the corporation to purchase the shares even if the inability of the
estate to dispose of the shares causes difficulty in settling the estate. 2"
Neither the corporation nor the majority shareholder is under an obliga-
tion to create a market for the shares of a minority shareholder unless
corporate assets are used to provide a market for the shares of another
shareholder.2"1 Similarly, a shareholder who acquires control of a
195. Id. at 803.
196. Cf. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 n.17 (Mass. 1975) (expanding
holding to non-majority shareholders).
197. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). See also
Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173 (Mass. 1985) (allowing recapitalization where no less drastic
alternative course of action existed); Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Haskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 376
(Mont. 1990) (justifying refusal to buy shares of minority shareholder at a price corporation could
not afford).
198. See Solomon v. Atlantic Dev., 516 A.2d 132 (Vt. 1986) (alternatives considered included
bankruptcy and sale of shares).
199. Id. at 136 (holding that evidence supported finding of trial court).
200. See Goode v. Ryan, 489 N.E.2d 1001, 1004-05 (Mass. 1986).
201. Compare Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975) (finding
that the controlling shareholders used corporate assets to provide a market for shares held by a
member of the controlling group).
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closely-held corporation by purchasing with his or her personal funds the
shares of some shareholders is under no obligation to purchase the shares
of other shareholders at the same price.20 2 The majority shareholder has
not used corporate funds to provide a benefit to shareholders on a selec-
tive basis.20 3
Finally, the strict fiduciary duty of good faith and loyalty is limited
to shareholders in closely-held corporations. 2" A closely-held corpora-
tion is characterized by a small number of shareholders and the lack of a
ready market for its shares.2 °5 One case holds that the common law defi-
nition of a closely-held corporation does not apply where a close corpora-
tion statute sets out the conditions for a court-ordered buy-out of a
shareholder's shares.20 6 The case holds that under those circumstances,
the statutory definition controls and that the corporation involved did
not meet that definition.20 7
C. Contracting Out of the Duty
Shareholders in a closely-held corporation have the ability to con-
tract out of the application of the strict fiduciary duty of good faith and
loyalty. In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,20 8 the court found that the
selective repurchase of shares by a corporation was, under the facts of the
case, a breach of fiduciary duty by the controlling group of shareholders.
In a footnote, however, the court stated: "[A] close corporation may
purchase shares from one stockholder without offering the others an
equal opportunity if all other stockholders give advance consent to the
stock purchase arrangements through acceptance of an appropriate pro-
vision in the articles of incorporation, the corporate by-laws or a stock-
holder's agreement."20 9 For example, where all the shareholders enter
202. Cf Kennedy v. Titcomb, 553 A.2d 1322 (N.H. 1989) (holding that the equal opportunity
rule did not apply to the facts of the case and declining to accept or reject the rule).
203. Cf. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511 (noting that corporate funds were used to repurchase
shares selectively).
204. See id. (limiting holding to cases involving close corporations).
205. See Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 978 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
Additionally, the Donahue court mentioned a third factor: "substantial majority stockholder partici-
pation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation." Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at
511.
206. Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (defin-
ing close corporation, according to state statute, as corporation having not more than a specified
number of shareholders).
207. Id. at 357. But cf Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 321-22 (Ill. App. Ct.) (applying
common law definition of a close corporation to a corporation not organized under the Close Corpo-
ration Act), cert. denied, 561 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1990).
208. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
209. Id at 518 n.24 (citations omitted). Cf generally Butler & Ribstein, supra note 27 (arguing
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into an agreement in advance for the corporation to repurchase the
shares of any shareholder who dies, "questions of good faith and loyalty
do not arise."' 21 ' Further, some persons may prefer to do business among
themselves "strictly in accord with the norms of general corporation
law.",2 1
One approach is to draft a provision that attempts to provide a blan-
ket waiver of the strict fiduciary duty of good faith and loyalty. Another
is to draft a narrow provision that exempts a particular type of transac-
tion or transactions, such as repurchases of shares by the corporation,
from the strict fiduciary duty.21 2 Presumably the fiduciary duty also ap-
plies to the execution of a provision waiving the duty.21 3 If so, a provi-
sion that is narrowly tailored and comprehensible is more likely to be
upheld if challenged than a blanket waiver. 2 4 Where a blanket waiver of
the duty is desired, a blanket waiver can be coupled with non-exclusive,
narrowly drafted provisions covering specific transactions.2 15
VII. DUTIES REGARDING THE SALE OF SHARES
A. In General
Absent special circumstances a shareholder may sell his or her
shares to whomever he or she pleases, or may refuse to sell such
shares.216 A shareholder is not obligated to offer his or her shares to the
corporation or to other shareholders before selling them and, in addition,
is not obligated to disclose his or her intention to sell the shares.217 In
in favor of private ordering of fiduciary duties of corporate managers as opposed to a system of
mandatory rules).
210. Evangelista v. Holland, 537 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989). Cf Gallagher v.
Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136, 137-38 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that no breach of fiduciary duty occurred
where employee was fired allegedly for sole purpose of enabling management to acquire his shares
under mandatory share buy-back provision because agreement defined scope of duty).
211. Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941, 945 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
212. See Rainer L.C. Frost, Note, Contractual Disclaimers of the Donahue Fiduciary Duty: The
Efficacy of the Anti-Donahue Clause, 26 B.C.L. REv. 1215, 1233-37 (1985) (discussing and giving
examples of provisions attempting to provide blanket waivers and provisions that are more narrowly
drafted).
213. Id. at 1244.
214. See id. at 1243-47 (discussing enforceability of disclaimers of fiduciary duty in the close
corporation context).
215. See id. at 1235 n.243 for examples.
216. See Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 376-78 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that share-
holder has right to sell without offering shares to corporation or disclosing to corporation facts
regarding sale); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 408 (Del. 1985) (validating right to
sell without disclosing negotiations to corporation); Glass v. Glass, 321 S.E.2d 69, 75-76 (Va. 1984)
(noting in dicta that shareholder has right to not sell).
217. See Treadway Co., 638 F.2d at 376-78; Frantz Mfg., 501 A.2d at 408. Both of these cases
involve shareholder-directors.
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addition, a controlling shareholder is not obligated to sell his or her
shares to a third person where the sale would benefit the minority share-
holders.218 However, a controlling shareholder has a duty not to transfer
his or her shares where he or she is on notice that the purchaser intends
to or is likely to loot the corporation.219 In addition, a shareholder's
right to transfer his or her shares may be subject to lawful transfer re-
strictions imposed by the corporation's articles of incorporation or by-
laws, or by an agreement to which he or she is a party.22°
A shareholder is generally entitled to sell his or her shares at a pre-
mium price without any obligation to offer other shareholders an oppor-
tunity to sell a pro rata portion of their shares221 or, alternatively, to
share the premium with other shareholders.222 Where the premium price
is received in return for the sale of a corporate office, asset, or opportu-
nity, the corporation may recover the premium.223 In addition, if the
shareholder receiving the premium employs wrongful means to assist the
purchaser in acquiring the share of other shareholders, he or she may be
required to share the premium with those shareholders.224
B. Sale to a Looter
A controlling shareholder is under a duty not to transfer control to
another where the circumstances surrounding the proposed transfer are
sufficient to put the shareholder on notice that the purchaser may loot
the corporation.225 Where the circumstances are sufficient to put a pru-
dent person on guard, the controlling shareholder has a duty before sell-
ing the shares to conduct a reasonable investigation into whether the
purchaser intends to defraud the corporation.226  The shareholder
breaches his or her duty if he or she sells without any investigation or
218. See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 353 A.2d 840, 844-45 (Del. 1987) (holding that ma-
jority shareholder had no duty to auction shares to the corporation before effectuating cash out
merger); Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., No. Civ. A. 9212, 1990 WL 135923 (Del. Ch. Sept.
19, 1991) (holding that even a majority shareholder has discretion regarding when and to whom to
sell his or her shares); Glass, 321 S.E.2d at 78 (finding majority shareholders not liable for choice of
purchaser even though minority received less for its shares as a result of that choice).
219. See discussion infra part VII.B.
220. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1991); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.27
(1984).
221. See discussion infra part VII.H.
222. See discussion infra part VII.C.
223. See discussion infra parts VI.D-F.
224. See discussion infra part VII.G.
225. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1940); DeBaun
v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Harris v. Carter, 582
A.2d 222, 235 (Del. Ch. 1990).
226. Insuranshares Corp., 35 F. Supp. at 25; DeBaun, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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sells after an inadequate investigation. On the other hand, the duty is not
breached by sale of the shares where a reasonable investigation discloses
facts from which a prudent person would conclude that no fraud is in-
tended or is likely to occur.2 27
A controlling shareholder is under no duty to investigate a prospec-
tive purchaser of his or her shares absent circumstances that put him or
her on notice that the purchaser intends or is likely to loot the corporate
assets.228 Circumstances which may put the seller on notice of the pur-
chaser's intent to defraud the corporation include but are not limited to:
(1) facts suggesting that the purchaser intends to finance the purchase or
to secure the purchase price with corporate assets;229 (2) the knowledge
that the corporation was the subject of looting in the past;230 (3) a request
by the purchasers that assets of the corporation be converted into cash
prior to the closing on the sale of shares and/or that the purchasers have
assess to its liquid assets immediately after closing;2 31 (5) the payment of
an excessive price for the shares given the nature of the corporation's
assets;2 32 (6) unfavorable credit reports on the purchaser or businesses
controlled by the purchaser;2 33 and (7) prior frauds committed by the
buyer on the seller.234 Evidence of facts that a reasonable investigation
would reveal are not relevant to the question of whether the seller is on
notice of facts suggesting that the buyer intends to or is likely to loot the
corporation since no duty to investigate exists absent such notice. 235
Generally more than one of these factors is present in the cases in
227. Compare Insuranshares Corp., 35 F. Supp. at 25-27 (holding that seller did not make an
adequate investigation), with Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that
investigation conducted by the seller was adequate to avoid liability under the circumstances).
228. Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th
Cir. 1975).
229. Insuranshares Corp., 35 F. Supp. at 25; DeBaun, 120 Cal. Reptr. at 357 (noting that sellers
knew buyer could make payments only by resorting to presale retained earnings and assets). Com-
pare Swinney, 480 F.2d 573 (noting that seller made clear that buyer must consummate the purchase
with buyer's own funds and it appeared that buyer had the financial ability to do so).
230. Insuranshares Corp., 35 F. Supp. at 25.
231. Id. at 26.
232. Id. (applying rule to investment company); Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 208 S.W.2d
344, 351-52 (Tenn. 1948) (holding that selling price was so far in excess of market price that it
constituted "a badge of fraud"). Cf Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 654-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1941) (investment company whose assets could be substantially duplicated within several days;
under these circumstances, excessive price charged seller with notice of fraudulent intent on the part
of the buyer). But cf Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 38 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 (N.Y. App. Div.
1942) (holding that under the circumstances, receipt of a premium price for the shares of a mercan-
tile firm did not suggest presence of fraud).
233. DeBaun, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 356, 360.
234. Id. (finding that fraud was committed on seller's predecessor in interest).
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which a seller of control is held to be on notice that the purchaser intends
or is likely to loot the corporation. Thus, in the leading case of Insuran-
shares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,236 the circumstances which put the
sellers on notice included an excessive price in light of the corporation's
assets, prior looting of the corporation, reason to suspect that the pur-
chaser intended to finance the purchase with corporate assets, and a re-
quest that a large part of the corporation's assets be converted to cash
which was available to the purchasers immediately after closing. 3 7 In
another well-known case, the circumstances placing the seller on notice
include knowledge that the purchaser needed to resort to the corpora-
tion's presale assets and retained earnings in order to make the payments
on the shares, a very unfavorable credit report on the purchaser and enti-
ties which he controlled, and a prior fraud by the purchaser against the
seller's predecessor in interest.238 In most cases an excessive price for the
shares is insufficient by itself to put a seller of control on notice of a
prospective purchaser's fraudulent intent,239 although an excessive price
is notice of possible fraudulent intent by the purchaser where the seller is
aware that the purchaser has neither the assets nor the credit necessary
to pay the purchase price.24
Where the controlling shareholder retains a significant and valuable
relationship with the corporation as a result, for example, of a substantial
lease between the shareholder and the corporation or of the shareholder's
status as an unsecured creditor of the corporation, a court is less likely to
find that the shareholder is on notice of potential looting by the pur-
chaser of his or her shares.241 In this type of situation the shareholder
has substantial financial incentives not to sell to a purchaser whom he or
236. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
237. Id. at 25-26. Additionally, the sellers' attorney warned them of the dangers of selling to
persons about whom they knew very little. Id. at 26.
238. DeBaun, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354.
239. Cf Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978). In Claggett, minority shareholders
had sued personally to recover the loss in the value of their shares. The court held that the 400
percent premium was not so unreasonable as to put the seller on notice of the likelihood of fraud by
the purchaser and found no evidence of looting.
240. See Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 208 S.W.2d 344 (Tenn. 1948) (passing on sale in which
seller extended $225,000 in credit to a corporation with no credit or assets). Compare Swinney v.
Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973) (noting that although it did not do so, purchaser had the
financial ability to consummate the purchase with its own funds).
241. See Harman v. Willbern, 274 F. Supp. 1149, 1156 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333
(10th Cir 1975) (ruling in case in which seller, his immediate family, and a family corporation lost
$241,000 after corporation filed bankruptcy); Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 38 N.Y.S.2d 517,
521-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942) (corporation controlled by the family of majority shareholder was
landlord of corporation under a very favorable long term lease).
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she suspects intends to loot the corporation.242 Presumably the existence
of this financial interest gives rise to an inference of lack of notice.
Some scholars argue that a controlling shareholder should have a
duty to investigate a prospective purchaser of his or her shares regardless
of the absence of suspicious circumstances.243 Arguments supporting the
imposition of such a duty include the possibility of substantial harm to
the minority from a transfer of control, 2' the fact that an investigation is
unlikely to be very costly or difficult, 245 and the fact that such investiga-
tions are already commonly done because sellers are concerned about the
financial ability of the parties with whom they are negotiating.246 Thus,
a strong argument can be made that the cost of imposing a duty on a
seller of control to investigate the reputation and financial ability of a
prospective purchaser of his or her control is outweighed by the potential
harm such sales can cause to the minority.
On the other hand, some scholars question the wisdom of cases im-
posing liability for sale of control to a looter, arguing that it is difficult to
detect potential looters, that looters acquire a reputation that prevents
them from looting again, that most refusals to sell after a reasonable in-
vestigation are "false positives," and that the best way to deter looting is
to punish looters very severely.247 These scholars conclude that a duty to
investigate potential purchasers of control is costly and deters many ben-
eficial transactions. 24 This view is subject to several criticisms, includ-
ing that it places the whole loss caused by looting on the innocent
minority shareholders and creditors of the corporation while absolving
the controlling shareholder who sold to the looter and who retains the
benefits of the sale.249
The duty of the controlling shareholder not to sell when he or she is
242. Harman, 520 F.2d at 1335 ( noting that defendant suffered, rather than profited, from the
looting of the corporation).
243. See Alfred Hill, Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REv. 986, 1025-28 (1957) (positing
that inquiry should encompass "the probable impact of the transfer of control upon the remaining
shareholders").
244. Id. at 1026-27.
245. Cf Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36
CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 248, 265, 267 (1985) (noting the development of national credit reporting
companies).
246. See Hill, supra note 243, at 1025.
247. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L. 1. 698, 718-19 (1982).
248. Id. at 719.
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on notice of potential looting by the purchaser is a duty to the corpora-
tion.250 The duty may also be owed to minority shareholders.25' If the
duty is breached, the damages to the corporation include the value of any
corporate assets lost as a result of the looting as well as the amount nec-
essary to discharge any obligations incurred by the corporation as a re-
sult of the looting such as, for example, the amount of employee health
insurance premiums embezzled by the purchaser.25 2 In addition, one
case holds that the corporation may recover a goodwill factor measured
"on the basis of future net income reasonably to be anticipated" from the
corporation's past earnings record.253 Further, another case suggests
that the corporation may recover both damages to the corporation and
the amount by which the price of the shares sold to the looter exceeded
the value of the shares.254 The seller is not, however, liable merely be-
cause of fear that the buyer is unable to pay for the shares without loot-
ing the corporation's assets or that the buyer will otherwise harm the
corporation where there is no allegation or proof that the feared events
have occurred. 5
Finally, looting cases must be distinguished from leveraged buyouts
in which all of a corporation's shares are purchased and corporate assets
are used to finance the transaction.256 Where the purchaser buys all of
the outstanding shares there can be no liability for looting, even though
the transaction might be a fraudulent transfer in violation of the rights of
corporate creditors.257
C. Sale at a Premium
Absent special circumstances, a controlling shareholder may sell his
or her shares in a private sale at a premium price without any obligation
to share the premium with other shareholders or to offer them an equal
250. See Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
251. See DeBaun v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 354, 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding that duty runs both to the corporation and to the minority shareholders).
252. Id. at 361-62; see also Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 208 S.W.2d 344 (Tenn. 1948) (ruling
on suit brought by receiver of corporation based on a civil conspiracy theory against both sellers of
and purchasers of majority of corporation's shares).
253. DeBaun, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62.
254. See Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 659 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). Compare PRINCIPLES,
supra note 80, § 5.16 cmt. e (seller is liable for damages equal to greater of amount of injury to
corporation or the premium received).
255. Blackmon v. Carson, 410 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (affirming dismissal of
complaint because plaintiffs failed to allege that feared events had occurred).
256. See Hamilton, supra note 245, at 268 n.54.
257. See generally David A. Murdoch et al., Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Transfers: Lffe
After Gleneagles," 43 Bus. LAW. 1 (1987).
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opportunity to participate in the sale of shares.2 58 A potential purchaser
of controlling shares who believes that better management of the corpo-
ration's assets can produce gains will pay a premium for the opportunity
to manage the firm's assets.259 The premium over market price is the
amount that the purchaser "is willing to pay for the privilege of directly
influencing the corporation's affairs."'2 ° Under current law this pre-
mium belongs to the seller of the controlling interest,261 is not a corpo-
rate asset,262 and need not be shared with other shareholders.263 In
addition, the purchaser in a private sale of controlling shares has no duty
to purchase all shares at the same price.2 4
Arguably, allowing controlling shareholders to obtain a premium
increases shareholder wealth by encouraging the sale of controlling
shares to purchasers who will manage the corporate assets more effi-
ciently. Under this view, a rule requiring a controlling shareholder to
share the premium with other shareholders discourages the sale of con-
trolling interests to such persons.2 65 On the other hand, even assuming
that sale of control produces gains, the purchaser of a controlling interest
might not share those gains with the minority shareholders, preferring
instead to increase management perquisites while placing the sharehold-
ers on "starvation returns.12 66 Indeed, a potential purchaser of a con-
trolling interest might be motivated by the belief that current
management is inefficient in obtaining perks and may be willing to pay a
premium for the opportunity to enjoy increased perks.2 67 Some scholars
argue that the minority shareholders should share pro rata in any pre-
mium which a purchaser of a controlling interest is willing to pay,268
258. McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969) (majority of shares were sold at a price
not available to minority shareholders); Ritchie v. McGrath, 571 P.2d 17 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977)
(majority of shares sold for $80 per share; minority of shares sold for $50.20 per share); Zetlin v.
Hanson Holdings, Inc. 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979) (per curiam) (sale of 44.4% of the outstanding
shares of a corporation for $15 per share at a time when the market price was $7.38 per share); Shoaf
v. Warlick, 380 S.E.2d 865 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
259. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 247, at 705.
260. Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. 1979) (per curiam).
261. See cases cited in note 251.
262. See discussion infra part VILE.
263. A number of scholars argue that the rule should be otherwise. See discussion infra part
VII.H.
264. Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1984).
265. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 247, at 708-11. Some scholars argue that a rule
requiring the sharing of the premium would not discourage beneficial transactions. See discussion
infra part VII.H.
266. See Hamilton, supra note 245, at 256-57. See also Richard W. Jennings, Trading in Corpo-
rate Control, 44 CAL. L. Rav. 1, 14-16 (1956) (discussing exploitation of corporate control for per-
sonal advantage).
267. See Hamilton, supra note 245, at 256 n.24.
268. See, eg., William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
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although the courts have consistently held that minority shareholders
have no right to share in the premium.2 6 9
A shareholder is not entitled to retain any premium that represents
a payment for sale of a corporate office, 270 asset, or opportunity.271 In
addition, a controlling shareholder may be forced to disgorge a premium
paid by a purchaser where the shareholder unfairly assists the purchaser
in obtaining the minority's shares by, for example, misrepresenting the
amount he or she is receiving for his or her shares.27 2
A careful lawyer can advise sellers of controlling shares to attempt
to convince the buyer to purchase the shares of the minority at the same
price per share that the controlling shareholder receives.273 Where the
purchaser plans to offer to purchase the shares of the minority sharehold-
ers at a lower price per share than that paid to the controlling share-
holder, the controlling shareholder should make certain that this fact is
revealed to minority shareholders in order to avoid any potential liability
under a nondisclosure theory. 4 In addition, the seller can also seek an
agreement by the purchaser to indemnify the seller against claims by
other shareholders arising out of the price differential.275
Where a tender offer is made for shares of a publicly-held corpora-
tion, federal law requires that the bidder must open the offer to all hold-
ers of the class of shares, pay all shareholders who tender shares the
highest price paid to any other shareholder during the tender offer, and
purchase a pro rata amount of each tendering shareholder's shares if the
offer is oversubscribed.276
Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505, 506 (1965); Jennings, supra note 266, at 31. Professors Andrews and
Jennings argue that minority shareholders should be afforded an opportunity to participate ratably
in any offer to purchase a controlling interest in the corporation. See also discussion infra part
VII.H.
269. Martin v. Marlin, 529 So. 2d 1174, 1176-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Zetlin v. Hanson
Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 1979) (per curiam).
270. See, eg., Brecher v. Gregg, 392 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). See also discussion
infra part VII.D.
271. See, eg., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). See also discussion infra part
VILE.
272. See Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68, 69 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706 (1937); Porter v.
Healy, 91 A. 428 (Pa. 1914). See also discussion infra part VII.G.
273. See Hill, supra note 243, at 987. See also Andrews, supra note 268, at 506 ("Careful practi-
tioners have therefore been concerned about the risks in any sale of controlling shares at a premium
over the price available on the market to other shareholders."); John W. Herz, The Sale of Control,
23 CORP. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 381, 396 (1981) ("Seller should, where practicable, seek to have
the buyer offer to purchase the shares of all the shareholders at the same price the seller receives.").
274. See Hamilton, supra note 245, at 280 & n.103.
275. Herz, supra note 273, at 397.
276. See §§ 14(d)(6), (7), Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6), (7); Rule 14d-
10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1990).
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D. Sale of Corporate Office
A corporate office is not the individual property of the officeholder
to be disposed of as he or she wishes.27 7 Thus, a contract in which a
corporate office is sold or in which control of a corporation unaccompa-
nied by any shares is sold is unenforceable and a breach of the office-
holder's duties to the corporation.278 For example, one case holds that a
contract in which the seller of corporate shares promises to make the
purchaser the manager and a principal officer of a corporation at a fixed
salary is void as against public policy.279 Another holds that the former
president-director of an insurance corporation is accountable to the cor-
poration for money he received for resigning as president and director,
procuring the resignations of other directors, and insuring that the va-
cancies are filled with specified individuals.2 8 ° In summary, contracts for
the illegal sale of corporate office or for the sale of control are unenforce-
able, and the seller under such a contract is accountable to the corpora-
tion for any proceeds received from the transaction. Additionally, the
appropriate court may remove the purchaser of office from his or her
office.281
On the other hand, it is axiomatic that the owner of a majority of
the voting shares of a corporation can elect a majority of the directors.
Therefore, a purchaser of these shares can eventually elect a majority of
the directors. If the terms of the directors are not staggered, a purchaser
of a majority of the voting shares can elect a majority of the board at the
next annual meeting of shareholders.282 If the terms of the directors are
staggered, however, it can take more than a year for the purchaser of a
majority of the shares to elect a majority of the board.28 3 It is not against
public policy to accelerate the transfer of control to the purchaser of a
277. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962).
278. See, eg., McClure v. Law, 55 N.E. 388 (N.Y. 1899) (finding former president and director
of corporation accountable to corporation for money received for procuring the resignations of the
corporation's directors and the appointment of designated individuals as their successors); Fennessy
v. Ross, 39 N.Y.S. 323 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896) (holding contract involving sale of office
unenforceable).
279. Fennessy, 39 N.Y.S. at 323.
280. McClure, 55 N.E. at 388.
281. See, eg., McClure, 55 N.E. at 388 (holding seller held accountable to corporation); In re
Caplan's Petition, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (vacating appointment of directors),
aff'd, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. 1964); Fennessy, 39 N.Y.S. at 323 (holding contract unenforceable).
282. See, eg., San Remo Copper Mining Co. v. Moneuse, 133 N.Y.S. 509 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912)
(involving purchaser of "vast majority" of corporate shares who had ability to elect a board of
directors at the next annual shareholders' meeting).
283. See, eg., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575-76 (2d Cir. 1962) (involving a
purchaser of enough shares to provide "working control" who could not, in the normal course of
events, elect a majority of the board until approximately eighteen months after the purchase).
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majority of the corporate shares by, for example, having existing direc-
tors replace themselves by resigning seriatim and filling the vacancies
with persons designated by the purchaser.284 There is "no reason why a
purchaser of majority control should not ordinarily be permitted to make
his control effective from the moment of the transfer of stock." '285 Thus,
a contractual provision requiring a transfer of control as a condition of
sale of a majority of the voting shares is not objectionable.286
In some cases the holder of less than a majority of the voting shares
is able to elect a majority of the corporation's board of directors. If the
shareholder owns enough shares to exercise "working control" over the
management of the corporation, the immediate transfer of control of the
board to a purchaser of shares does not offend public policy.287 The
transfer of control merely accelerates an inevitable process. On the other
hand, where the shares transferred are insufficient to provide the pur-
chaser with working control, an agreement to transfer control to the pur-
chaser is against public policy.288 In such a case, any premium received
by the seller of the shares is in fact received for the sale of a corporate
office.289 Arguably the distinction between a sale of shares carrying
"working control" and one that does not is also supportable on the the-
ory that "[o]ne who buys a controlling bloc of shares cannot hurt the
corporation without hurting himself too."29 Under this view, a buyer
willing to purchase a substantial stake in the corporation is, in effect,
posting "a bond for honest conduct." '291
Whether a block of shares carries with it "working control" is a
question of fact.2 92 A block should not be found to carry working con-
trol unless it is a practical certainty that the ownership of the block guar-
antees the voting power necessary to choose a majority of the directors of
284. See San Remo Copper Mining Co., 133 N.Y.S. at 509 (upholding sale to purchaser of over
420,000 shares in corporation with 500,000 authorized shares); cf Essex Universal Corp., 305 F.2d at
576 (upholding sale of 28.3% of shares).
285. Essex Universal Corp., 305 F.2d at 579.
286. Cf id. at 577 (remanding question of whether 28.3% of shares constituted "working
control").
287. Id.
288. In re Caplan's Petition, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (vacating appointment as
directors of persons designated by the purchaser of three percent of the outstanding shares in
corporation).
289. Brecher v. Gregg, 392 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that premium received
in exchange for promise to transfer control was contrary to public policy as a matter of law where
only 4% of the outstanding shares were transferred).
290. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 247, at 722.
291. Id.
292. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962); Carter v. Muscat, 251
N.Y.S.2d 378, 381 (App. Div. 1964).
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the corporation or, in other words, ownership of the block is equivalent
to ownership of a majority block.z93 An important consideration in an-
swering this question is the size of the block of shares transferred. If the
block transferred is large in relation to any other organized block of
shares, it is reasonable to infer that shares confer working control.2 94
Conversely, if the block transferred is very small, it is reasonable to infer
that the shares do not confer working control.2 95 In addition, an infer-
ence of control may arise if the directors designated by the buyers are
subsequently elected directors at the annual meeting of shareholders.296
Arguably the ability of the seller of the block of shares to exercise
working control before the sale permits an inference that working control
is transferred to the purchaser.297 On the other hand, presumably the
focus is on whether working control is transferred to a particular pur-
chaser. It is possible that other shareholders will organize to create a
block of shares sufficient to prevent a purchaser from exercising working
control. If a party challenging the transaction can prove that this is
likely to happen, then working control is not transferred.298
One way of testing whether the purchaser of a block of shares ob-
tains control of the corporation by virtue of ownership of the block is to
have an election of directors by the shareholders. If the purchaser's des-
ignees are elected, then presumably his or her shares confer working con-
trol. Obviously such an election is a mere formality where the purchaser
has approximately 50 percent or more of the outstanding voting shares of
a publicly-held corporation.299 Where, however, the block of shares
transferred is significantly less than 50%, immediate transfer of control
293. Id. (Lumbard, J.); cf id at 581 (Friendly, J., concurring) (suggesting that often the ques-
tion of whether working control is transferred can only be determined by an election).
294. Cf id. at 580 (Clark, J., concurring in result) ("Surely in the normal course of events a
management which has behind it 28.3 percent of the stock has working control .... ").
295. See Brecher v. Gregg, 392 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (concluding as a matter of
law that the premium received by seller of four percent of outstanding shares was not for practical
control); cf. In re Caplan's Petition, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (addressing transfer of
3% of outstanding shares), aff'd, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
296. Cf Carter v. Muscat, 251 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964). Carter involved the trans-
fer of approximately 10% of shares. The shareholders subsequently endorsed directors designated
by the purchaser.
297. Id at 380 (noting that 10% of shares was sufficient for several years to control corpora-
tion's board of directors).
298. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962) (placing burden of
proof on party challenging the transaction since 28.3% of voting shares of a public corporation is
"usually tantamount to majority control").
299. Id. at 581 (Friendly, J., concurring) (expressing a preference for a "mere formality" stan-
dard); Martin v. Marlin, 529 So. 2d 1174, 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding, under facts of
case, that new elections were "mere formality").
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of the board to the purchaser can assist the purchaser in obtaining con-
trol by avoiding the risk of an election and, similarly, in retaining control
by providing control over the corporate proxy machinery.3" In this situ-
ation, control does not derive entirely from the ownership of the shares
themselves. 30 1 A court should find that the holder of a block of shares
has working control only if the risk posed by rival groups in an election
of directors is minimal even without access to the corporate proxy
machinery.30 2
Where a transfer of control via the seriatim resignation and replace-
ment of directors occurs in connection with the purchase of more than
five percent of a class of equity securities registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,303 the corporation must file with the Securities
Exchange Commission and provide specified information about the di-
rectors and the principal shareholders to shareholders "who would be
entitled to vote at a meeting for election of directors. ' ' 3°  This require-
ment applies to purchases of shares in both private transactions and
tender offers.305
E. Sale of Corporate Asset or Opportunity
Where the premium received by the seller of corporate shares is ac-
tually compensation for sale of a corporate asset or for a corporate op-
portunity, the premium is recoverable by the corporation.30 6 In the well-
known case of Perlman v. Feldmann,30 7 a controlling block of 37 percent
of a corporation's shares was sold for $20 per share to an end-user of
steel, the corporation's product. The sale took place at a time of short
supply in the steel market. The market price of the corporation's shares
had not exceeded $12 per share. One of the selling shareholders was not
only the dominant shareholder in the corporation, but was also the presi-
dent and the chairman of the board .30  A derivative suit was brought
300. See Hill, supra note 243, at 998-99.
301. Id. at 999.
302. Id
303. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988) (registration requirement).
304. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1988); Rule 14f-1, 17 C.F.R.
240.14f-1 (1992).
305. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d), 14(d), (f); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d), (f)
(1988).
306. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 76 A. 77, 79-80 (Pa. 1910) (finding profits
on sale of shares were incident to sale of corporate real estate).
307. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
308. The shareholder, his family members, and his personal corporation owned 33 percent of the
outstanding shares. Id. at 174 n.1.
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seeking recovery of alleged illegal gains received by the sellers as com-
pensation for the sale of corporate asset. The alleged asset sold was the
ability to control the allocation of the corporation's product, steel, in a
time of market shortage. The trial court found that the price of $20 per
share was a fair price for a control block of shares, but also noted that the
evidence did not show what the shares were worth if stripped of the
power to control the allocation of the corporation's scarce product.3 09
On appeal, the trial court was reversed. The appellate court noted
that the corporation derived two potential benefits from the steel
shortage. These were, first, the ability to obtain interest free loans from
prospective purchasers of steel in return for a commitment to the pur-
chasers of future production and, second, the ability to use the shortage
to build up patronage in geographical areas in which the corporation
could complete after the shortage ended.31" The court held that the bur-
den rests with the fiduciary in this type of situation to negate any possi-
bility of gain to the corporation from the opportunities and that the
defendants had not met the burden in the case.311
The case generated a significant amount of commentary, and schol-
ars disagree on the real basis for the court's decision to impose liability.
One interpretation is that the case is best explained as a disguised pre-
mium for a corporate product, steel, which was in short supply, and that
all shareholders should share equally in any profit resulting from a high
demand for the corporation's product.312  For example, one way in
which all shareholders can share in the profit is through a merger with an
end-user of steel. The majority shareholder (who was also president of
the corporation) was in fact approached with a merger offer on terms
very favorable to the shareholders and, in his capacity as president, re-
jected the offer.313 Thus, one can argue that an opportunity to enter into
a favorable corporate transaction was usurped.314 A similar interpreta-
tion is that the case is best explained as a corporate opportunity case in
which the defendants were forced to disgorge the value of a usurped op-
portunity, namely the opportunity to utilize the steel shortage to obtain
309. See id. at 175. The court found the book value to be $17.03 per share. Id.
310. Id. at 177.
311. Id. at 176-77.
312. Andrews, supra note 268, at 513-15.
313. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952) (ruling on securities fraud claim based on the transaction that gave rise to Perlman).
314. See Hamilton, supra note 245, at 275; see also Jennings, supra note 266, at 22-29 (discussing
corporate transaction theory); cf Andrews, supra note 268, at 543-45 (discussing the equivalent
effect of share purchases and purchases of assets from a corporation).
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interest free financing or to build up patronage.315 One commentator
argues that the case involved a breach of the duty not to sell control in
circumstances in which the corporation is threatened with significant
harm from the seller and, thus, that the case falls in the category of the
looting cases.316 Still others suggest that the control of a corporation
itself is an asset that belongs to a corporation, and that the case moves in
the direction of requiring a seller of control to account for any amount
above the value of the shares without control. 31 7
Regardless of any broader implications, at a minimum Perlman es-
tablishes that where a controlling shareholder receives a premium that
represents the payment for an asset or an opportunity belonging to the
corporation, the shareholder may be forced to account for and to dis-
gorge the profit. The case law rejects the arguments that corporate con-
trol itself is a corporate asset and that any control premium must be
shared by all shareholders. 318 "The law of the marketplace dictates that
a shareholder who has a controlling interest in a corporation will likely
be able to receive a higher price per share than a minority
shareholder." '319
However if something more than the control inherent in the shares
is transferred, the shareholder may be required to disgorge the premium.
For example, in one case the president of a corporation was approached
about the sale of the corporation's major asset, real estate, at a favorable
price. He rejected the offer, but agreed to sell enough shares to provide
control of the corporation.320 He then purchased enough additional
shares to fulfill his obligation under the contract without revealing the
facts to the shareholders selling their shares to him. The corporation's
principal asset was then sold to a corporation owned by the new control-
ling shareholders at a price that was not shown to be inadequate. The
court found that the sale of the shares and the sale of the real estate were
fairly considered as part of one transaction so that the profit to the share-
holder derived from the sale of the corporation's property rather than
from the sale of its shares.321 The purchasers wanted the property and
315. Jennings, supra note 266, at 11-13.
316. Hill, supra note 243, at 989-90.
317. See, eg., David C. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CAL. L. REV.
615, 615-16 (1969) (noting that the court "enunciated in embryo the custodial concept of corporate
control"); Berle, supra note 157, at 1220-21.
318. See generally discussion supra part VII.C and infra part VII.H.
319. Martin v. Marlin, 529 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
320. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 76 A. 77 (Pa. 1910).
321. Id. at 79.
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were willing to pay a price for it. Knowing this, the shareholder-presi-
dent sold shares for the purpose of diverting a portion of the price into
his own pocket.3"' Each shareholder was entitled to recover the share of
the profits that he or she would have received if the real estate had been
sold by the corporation.323
Presumably the premium is recoverable even where the shareholder
receiving the premium in return for a corporate asset or opportunity is
not a controlling shareholder. Thus, one case holds that a shareholder
who receives $9,000 for shares with a market value of $51.88 in exchange
for an agreement to discontinue a derivative suit without notifying the
other shareholders or seeking court approval must account to the
corporation. 24
The portion of the premium recoverable is the amount paid for the
corporate asset or for giving up the corporate opportunity. In Perlman v.
Feldmann,325 the court stated that defendants were entitled to retain the
value of their shares "without the appurtenant control over the corpora-
tion's output of steel." '326 It is very difficult in many cases to establish the
value of shares aside from the corporate asset transferred or corporate
opportunity given up. This makes the question of the allocation of the
burden of proof critical. Perlman allocates the burden to the shareholder
receiving the premium. 327
Where the premium price a shareholder receives upon the sale of his
or her shares is in return for the sale of a corporate asset or for giving up
a corporate opportunity, the action to recover the premium belongs to
the corporation and any recovery goes to the corporate treasury.328 In
exceptional cases, a court may allow an individual recovery by the share-
holders in a derivative suit. For example, the court in Perlman allowed
recovery by the minority shareholders, citing its desire to prevent the
purchaser of the controlling interest from participating in the
recovery.329
322. Id.
323. Id. at 80. Due to the unusual facts, the court approved the trial court's decision to permit
the shareholders to sue individually rather than derivatively. Id.
324. Clarke v. Greenberg, 71 N.E.2d 443 (N.Y. 1947) (reversing dismissal of complaint for fail-
ure to state a cause of action).
325. Id., 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
326. Id. at 178. On remand, the court found the "enterprise value" of each share to be $14.67.
See Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 446 (D. Conn. 1957).
327. Perlman, 219 F.2d at 178.
328. See id. at 180 (Swan, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 178; see also Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 76 A.77, 80 (Pa. 1910)
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F. The Corporate Transaction Theory
An argument can be made that a controlling shareholder should be
accountable to the minority shareholders whenever he or she uses his or
her control to obtain a benefit not available to minority shareholders by
entering into a personal transaction instead of a corporate transaction for
the benefit of all shareholders.330 Under this approach, a controlling
shareholder is liable whenever he or she uses a personal sale of shares to
"intercept profits in connection with a corporate transaction." 331 Several
cases reach results consistent with a corporate transaction theory. In
these cases the purchaser of the controlling shares initially expressed in-
terest in purchasing all of the corporation's shares or in purchasing the
assets of the corporation itself.332 In addition, in each case the purchaser
was instead sold either controlling shares or the shares of the directors
and of some favored shareholders at a premium.
In these cases the shareholders were required to share the premium
or to pay damages under one theory or another. In one case, the court
based liability upon the failure of the majority to inform the minority of
the purchaser's preference for an asset sale. The court found injury re-
sulted from the fact that the minority, if informed, could have refused to
sell their shares except on same terms as those available to the major-
ity.333 In another case, the court apparently was heavily influenced by
the fact that the offer to purchase control of the corporation was initially
made to the defendants in their capacities as officers and directors, and
(allowing individual recovery on the grounds that, among other things, the corporation had "practi-
cally gone into liquidation"); Jennings, supra note 266, at 28-29 (suggesting that a shareholder bring-
ing a derivative suit to recover a premium should join an individual or class claim where the
applicable rules of procedure permit the joinder of such claims). Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (joinder
of claims). For example, the court in Perlman allowed recovery by the minority shareholders, citing
its desire to prevent the purchaser of the controlling interest from participating in the recovery.
330. See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969) (majority shareholders trans-
ferred their shares to a holding corporation in order to deal with high book value instead of splitting
the shares); Jennings, supra note 266, at 22-29; see generally discussion supra part V.E. But cf
Tryon v. Smith, 229 P.2d 251 (Or. 1951) (refusing to hold liable majority shareholder, president, and
director, who was approached about sale of all shares of corporation and sold his shares and those of
associates for $460 per share while minority shareholders received $220).
331. Jennings, supra note 266, at 22.
332. See Brown v. Halbert, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (president and majority
shareholder of corporation asked at business office of corporation whether corporation was for sale);
Low v. Wheeler, 24 Cal. Rptr. 538, 541 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (purchaser initially interested in
asset purchase); Forinash v. Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (purchaser ap-
proached board about buying control; board arranged for sale of shares of the directors and those of
selected other shareholder); Porter v. Healy, 91 A. 428, 429 (Pa. 1914) (purchaser interested in
purchasing all of the shares of the directors in order to have corporate property and franchises).
333. Low, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
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not in their capacities as shareholders.334 In a third case, liability ap-
pears to be based on the fact that the purchasers placed a portion of the
purchase price in a "control fund" payable to the seller only after control
was transferred to the purchaser.335 Thus, this case can be viewed as a
sale of office case.336 While none of the three cases explicitly adopts a
corporate transaction theory, the results indicate that there is some risk
to a controlling shareholder in structuring a transaction as a sale of con-
trol shares at a premium where the purchaser is primarily interested in
the corporate assets and/or initially approaches the board of directors
and officers regarding the purchase of control.
On the other hand, under existing law there is no liability for receipt
of a premium where the purchaser initially approaches the controlling
shareholder regarding the purchase of his or her shares at a premium. 337
Other shareholders may not complain that the sale took the place of a
corporate transaction since the controlling shareholder is not obligated to
sell his shares338 or to vote the shares in favor of a corporate transac-
tion.339 In one case, though, the court held that under the facts of the
case the majority shareholder had a duty to seek substantially the same
benefits for the minority shareholders as he or she received. 34  Although
the result in the case can be justified on other grounds,341 this case comes
the closest to adopting a corporate transaction rationale.342
G. Misrepresentation Regarding or Nondisclosure of Premium
A controlling shareholder who receives a premium price not avail-
able to the minority shareholders is required to share the premium with
the other shareholders if he or she assists the purchaser in acquiring the
shares of the minority by misrepresenting the price paid for his or her
shares.343 In one case the controlling shareholders and the purchaser
represented to the minority shareholders that the price paid for all shares
334. Forinash, 697 S.W.2d at 299-300.
335. Porter, 91 A. at 430, 432.
336. The sellers in this case also assisted the purchaser in acquiring the shares of the minority
shareholders by misrepresenting that the sellers received the same amount that the purchaser offered
the minority shareholders for their shares. Id. at 430. See discussion supra part VII.D.
337. See discussion supra part VII.C.
338. See discussion supra part VII.A.
339. See discussion supra part IV.A.
340. Brown v. Halbert, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781, 793-94 (Cal. App. 1969).
341. See discussion of this case infra part VII.H.
342. Cf Brown, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95 (Draper, J., concurring) (referring to, among other
things, refusal of majority shareholder to entertain an offer for all the corporate assets as a justifica-
tion for decision).
343. Dunnet v. Am, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934).
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was $165 per share, but secretly agreed upon an additional payment of
$86,830 to the controlling shareholders. The minority shareholders were
permitted to recover a proportionate share of the secret bonus.3 " In
order to recover in such a situation a minority shareholder must prove
that he or she was induced to sell his or her shares by the
misrepresentation. 45
The A.L.L Principles of Corporate Governance go further and would
impose upon a controlling shareholder a duty to disclose to minority
shareholders the terms of sales at a premium where the controlling share-
holder deals with the minority shareholders in connection with the trans-
action.346 The duty applies, for example, where the controlling
shareholder helps the purchaser of his or her shares convince the other
shareholders to sell on terms less favorable than those he or she
receives.347
H. The Equal Opportunity Theory
A number of scholars argue that minority shareholders should have
an equal opportunity to participate in any sale of a controlling interest in
a corporation. 48 They argue that an equal opportunity rule discourages
sales of controlling interests where there is a risk of harm to the corpora-
tion through looting or mismanagement. Unless all shares are
purchased, the controlling shareholder is a minority shareholder after the
sale of control and therefore will be hesitant to sell to someone who will
injure the value of the shares he or she retains. 349 In addition, the sale of
controlling shares in a corporation is analogized to a sale of corporate
assets with a portion of the purchase price financed by the minority
shareholders. Proponents of the theory urge that the sale of controlling
shares is essentially a "corporate transaction" in which all shareholders
should participate equally. 50
A number of scholars challenge the equal opportunity theory on the
344. Porter v. Healy, 91 A. 428, 431 (Pa. 1914) (case decided as a sale of office case).
345. Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F..2d 68, 69 (10th Cir.) ("no proof that these plaintiffs were deceived
or induced to act by anything the defendants did or failed to do."), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706 (1937).
346. PRINCIPLES, supra note 80, § 5.16(a).
347. PRINCIPLES, supra note 80, § 5.16 cmt. d.
348. See Andrews, supra note 268; Jennings, supra note 266, at 29-33.
349. Andrews, supra note 266, at 517-19.
350. Id. at 520-21; Jennings, supra note 266, at 22-29 (discussing the corporate transaction the-
ory); see also discussion supra part VII.F.
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grounds that it would deter many beneficial transactions.35' Some con-
trolling shareholders will not want to become minority shareholders in
the corporation; perhaps some purchasers will not want a substantial mi-
nority shareholder to remain after the purchase. Further, some purchas-
ers will be unwilling or unable to buy all the corporate shares in order to
avoid these problems.35 2 Professor Andrews, a leading proponent of the
equal opportunity theory, argues that beneficial transactions generally
will not be deterred since: (1) if the purchaser is optimistic about the
possible gains from a change in management he or she will agree to buy
all the shares; (2) if the controlling shareholder is optimistic about possi-
ble gains he or she will agree to retain some of his or her shares; and (3) if
the minority shareholders are optimistic about possible gains they will
waive their right to participate in the sale.353
It is clear that an equal opportunity rule would result in a smaller
number of private sales of control. Indeed, the proponents of the theory
believe it would deter some sales of control - those that are harmful to
minority shareholders. The ultimate question then is whether private
sales of control generally benefit the corporation and the economy by
enabling control of corporate assets to be transferred to more efficient
managers. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is not yet clear.35 4
It is possible that a rule requiring sharing of the premium from a
sale of control shares would have costs apart from any deterrent effect on
beneficial transfers of control. Perhaps some entrepreneurs who are con-
sidering business ventures that would require additional financing from
minority shareholders would be deterred from embarking on the venture
by a rule requiring them to share any premium they receive if they subse-
quently sell their controlling shares.355
In any event, the equal opportunity theory is not currently accepted
by the courts.356 Various reasons are cited in the opinions for rejecting
351. See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 247; George B. Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the
Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 420 (1965).
352. Javaras, supra note 351, at 425-26.
353. Andrews, supra note 268, at 519.
354. See Hamilton, supra note 245, at 252-61 (discussing, among other things, the empirical
evidence on this question).
355. Joshua Ronen, Sale of Controlling Interest: A Financial Economic Analysis of the Governing
Law in the United States and Canada, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 23 (1986).
356. See Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1263-64 (4th Cir. 1978); McDaniel v. Painter, 418
F.2d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1969); Yerke v. Batman, 376 N.E.2d 1211, 1214-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978);
Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E. 2d 387 (N.Y. 1979) (per curiam). Cf also Doleman v.
Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a claim against a purchaser
of a control block based upon equal opportunity theory).
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the theory including: (1) precedent; (2) the desirability of legislative con-
sideration of radical departures from existing law; (3) a belief that the
rule would prevent many sales of control; and (4) the person nature of a
sale of shares.35 7
One case, if read broadly, appears to come close to adopting an
equal opportunity approach.358 In the case, the president and dominant
shareholder of a savings and loan was approached on the question of
whether the savings and loan was for sale. He responded that it was not,
but that he and his wife would entertain an offer for their shares. The
shares were subsequently sold for $1,548 per share. With the assistance
of the seller, the purchaser then acquired all but a few of the shares of the
minority for prices of from $611 to $650 per share. The court stated:
The rule we have adopted here simply is that it is the duty of the ma-
jority stockholder-director, when contemplating the sale of the major-
ity stock at a price not available to other stockholders and which sale
may prejudice the minority stockholders, to act affirmatively and
openly with full disclosure so that every opportunity is given to obtain
the same advantages that such fiduciary secured and for the full pro-
tection of the minority.3 9
A close examination of the case suggests, however, that the court's
primary concern was not equal opportunity, but rather harm to minority
shareholders. Two bases of possible harm to the shareholders are readily
discernible from the facts of the case. The first is based upon the appar-
ent initial interest of the purchaser in purchasing the entire association.
Arguably the majority shareholders usurped an opportunity for the cor-
poration to sell its assets, a transaction which benefits all shareholders.3 6°
The second is based upon the actions of the majority shareholder-presi-
dent in assisting the purchaser in its attempt to acquire the minority
shares. These actions included, among other things, discontinuing divi-
dend payments, and are clearly inconsistent with the fiduciary duties the
majority shareholder owed to the minority.361 In sum, the case does not
357. Claggett, 583 F.2d at 1263-64 (precedent; stifling of financial transactions); McDaniel, 418
F.2d 548 (precedent; discouraging of investments); Yerke, 376 N.E.2d at 1214-15 (precedent; per-
sonal nature of transaction); Zetlin, 397 N.E.2d 387 (precedent; desirability of legislative
consideration).
358. Brown v. Halbert, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
359. Id. at 793-94.
360. See discussion supra parts VII.E-F. But cf Tryon v. Smith, 229 P.2d 251 (Or. 1951) (find-
ing no breach of duty in failing to apprise minority of offer or in selling at premium price not
available to minority even though initial offer to seller, who was president and director of bank, was
to purchase all outstanding shares).
361. See discussion supra part V.E.
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represent a clear, unconditional acceptance of the equal opportunity
theory.
An interesting variation of the equal opportunity problem arises
when a controlling shareholder deals with a potential purchaser who
either desires to or is willing to purchase at a premium more shares than
the controlling shareholder holds. Authority suggests that the majority
shareholder may favor one shareholder or group of shareholders over
others in negotiating with the potential purchaser.362 If this is the case, a
shareholder may offer an opportunity to selected shareholders to partici-
pate in a sale of control without incurring an obligation to extend the
opportunity to all shareholders or to justify the discrimination, for exam-
ple, by proving that the preferred minority is in fact part of a unitary
group.363
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 adopts an equal opportunity
approach to the purchase of shares of a publicly held corporation
through a tender offer. The offer must be open to all holders of the class
of shares sought, a shareholder tendering shares must receive the highest
price paid by the tender offeror to another shareholder during the tender
offer, and the tender offeror must purchase a pro rata amount of the
shares tendered by each shareholder where the offer is oversubscribed. 3 4
VIII. DUTIES REGARDING THE PURCHASE OF SHARES
Shares in a corporation are the property of the individual sharehold-
ers, and the disposition the shares is generally not a concern of the corpo-
ration. 65 Absent special circumstances, a shareholder does not violate
any duty to the corporation by purchasing corporate shares from another
shareholder.3 66 This is true even where the corporation's shares are
closely-held, the purchase is at a favorable price, and the purpose of the
purchase is to gain control of the corporation.367 "[T]here is normally no
special corporate interest in the opportunity to purchase its own
362. See Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1264 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1978) (issue raised and decided
implicitly); Martin v. Marlin, 529 So.2d 1174, 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) ("If there is no duty to
share one's own profit, there is no duty to share one's friends' profits").
363. Cf. Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1266-67 (4th Cir. 1978) (Butzner, J., dissenting)
(arguing that persons in control of corporation may not use their control to discriminate among
shareholders of the same class).
364. See §§ 14(d)(6), (7), Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6), (7) (1988);
Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1990).
365. King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 118 S.E.2d 581, 585 (Ga. 1961).
366. Katz Corp. v T.H. Canty & Co., 362 A.2d 975, 980 (Conn. 1975); Zidell v Zidell, 560 P.2d
1091 (Or. 1977) (purchase of shares by shareholder-director).
367. Zidell, 560 P.2d at 1092-93.
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shares. ' 368 Further, a shareholder's failure to disclose his or her motive
in purchasing corporate shares is not a breach of duty to the corporation
even where the motive is to liquidate the corporation.369 Where, how-
ever, a corporation has a special interest in the opportunity to purchase
its shares, a shareholder who stands in a fiduciary capacity to the corpo-
ration, such as an officer, director, or controlling shareholder, may not
usurp that opportunity.370
Several cases indicate that in limited circumstances a shareholder's
purchase of corporate shares from another shareholder is a breach of
fiduciary duties to the other shareholders. In one case a shareholder in a
closely-held corporation purchased the shares of another shareholder de-
spite the fact that the shares were subject to a share redemption agree-
ment among the shareholders.371 The agreement provided that a
shareholder who desired to dispose of his or her shares was obligated to
offer the shares first to the corporation and then to other shareholders on
a pro rata basis. Since almost all of the corporate shares were held by
three equal shareholders before the sale, the prior balance of power
among the shareholders in the corporation was destroyed.372 The court
decided that the trial court erred in failing to find that the shareholder
who purchased the shares in violation of the agreement breached his fi-
duciary duties to the other shareholders.373 The case holds that the
shareholders in a close corporation owe each other a strict duty of good
faith similar to the duty a partner owes to his or her co-partners374 and
that the purchase of the shares without compliance with the share re-
demption agreement fell short of this good faith standard.375
In another case, two shareholders in a closely-held corporation each
held 425 of the 1,000 authorized corporate shares.376 The two sharehold-
ers, acting as directors, approved a resolution authorizing one share-
holder, as president, to borrow money and, if a loan were not readily
available, to sell additional shares. Soon afterwards the shareholder-
368. Id. at 1093.
369. King Mfg. Co., 118 S.E.2d 581 (shareholder-directors).
370. See, e.g., Sladen v. Rowse, 347 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1975) (shareholder-director purchased shares
that the corporation was interested in purchasing).
371. Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 1989).
372. The spouses of the three shareholder each held one share. Id. at 169. Presumably this did
not effect the balance of power in the corporation.
373. Id. at 171-73.
374. Id. at 171. See generally discussion supra part VI.A.
375. Fought, 543 So. 2d at 173.
376. Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 178).
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president sold 30 shares to his parents. Meanwhile, the other share-
holder purchased 75 shares that were held by the treasurer of the corpo-
ration. Eventually each shareholder challenged the actions of the other.
The trial court held that the shareholders intended to be equal part-
ners and invoked its equity powers to amend the articles of incorporation
to provide for two classes of shares, one voting and the other nonvoting.
The appellate court reversed on the grounds that absent statutory au-
thority, courts lack the power to amend a corporation's articles of incor-
poration. However, the appellate court stated that shareholders in
"incorporated partnerships" owe each other "a fiduciary duty to deal
fairly, honestly and openly., 37 7 The court found that the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's determination that the parties intended equal con-
trol and ownership of the business. 378 Therefore, the trial court was
justified under the facts of the case in finding that the shareholders owed
each other a fiduciary duty to disclose "the availability of outstanding
shares for sale and to afford the opportunity to share in the purchase of
such stock," and that both shareholders breached this duty.37 9 The case
was remanded to the trial court which, according to the appellate court,
may properly enter an order requiring the shareholders to exercise their
voting rights according to their agreement or requiring the sale of
"equalizing shares. '380
In sum, in jurisdictions in which the shareholders of closely-held
corporations are subject to fiduciary duties analogous to those of a part-
ner, 38 1 the purchase of shares from another shareholder is a breach of the
purchasing shareholder's fiduciary duties where it violates an agreement
among the shareholders restricting the transfer of the shares, where the
corporate shareholders intend a particular balance of power that is upset
by the purchase, or where there is other evidence of lack of good faith
towards other shareholders on the part of the shareholder buying the
shares. Where, however, the shareholders of the closely-held corporation
do not intend to be subject to fiduciary duties analogous to those of a
partner, a court may apply the general norms of corporation law and find
that the purchase of corporate shares is not a breach of fiduciary
duties.382
377. Id. at 945.
378. Id.
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381. See generally discussion supra parts VI.A-B.
382. Cf Cressy, 378 N.E.2d at 945 n.6 (shareholders in closely-held corporation may intend to
do business among themselves "strictly in accord with the norms of general corporation law"). See
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IX. CONCLUSION
An understanding of the role of shareholders in a corporation and
an attentiveness to the distinction between assets and opportunities
which belong to the corporation and those which do not are essential as
one sorts through the duties of shareholders in differing situations. In
counseling a shareholder in a planning context or defending a share-
holder in litigation, the attorney who has acquired such an understand-
ing and attentiveness can use the case law effectively to plan a course of
action or a legal argument. The attorney should be alert to situations in
which a shareholder exercises or has the power to exercise control over
the corporation and to situations in which a shareholder deals with or
causes foreseeable injury to corporate assets or opportunities. In addi-
tion, the attorney should remember that shareholders in closely-held cor-
porations are generally subject to the same duties as partners. Finally, he
or she should be aware that structuring a transaction as a personal trans-
action rather than a corporate transaction can involve some risk of
liability.
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